
Class 
Book 



IQ3 

N 



ANTI-SCEPTICISM ; 



OR, 



AN INQUIRY 



THE NATURE AND PHILOSOPHY 



LANGUAGE, 



AS CONNECTED WITH 



Wbt gsatxtb ^trtpttutg. 



BY 

JAMES WRIGHT, 

LATE OF MAGDALEN HALL, OXFORD ; 

AUTHOR OF " THE SCHOOL ORATOR," " THE PHILOSOPHY OF ELOCUTION," 

" READINGS OF THE LITURGY," &C. 



It is to be remembered that connexion is not identity. 

Remarks on Scepticism. 



SECOND EDITION. 



OXFORD : 

^ PRINTED FOR MUNDAY AND SLATTER ; 

AND GEO. B. WHITTAKER, 13, AVE-MARIA-LANE, LONDON. 

1827. 



PREFACE. 

AMONG all the inquiries which are presented 
to the student, there are few so well calculated to 
call forth his energies as some of the elementary 
questions respecting language. Those particu- 
larly concerning articulate voices in contradis- 
tinction to instinctive signs, the nature of the 
substantive and the verb, the use of the various 
parts of speech, universal grammar, and the di- 
versity of tongues, — are topics which excite in 
the mind of the intellectual student an especial 
interest. 

The Author has endeavoured to explain the 
significations of the substantive and the verb by 
the use of particular and general arguments, — all 
tending to assert the being and attributes of a 
First Cause, and to oppose the popular doctrines 
of atheistical and sceptical philosophy* 

What he has advanced concerning the writings 
of Locke, and his controversy with the Bishop of 
Worcester, is offered with exceeding diffidence. 



IV PKEFACE. 



The arguments respecting the primitive language 
are deduced entirely from the sacred writings, 
and the greater part of the notes illustrative of 
the text are sanctioned by the authorities of 
D'Oyly and Mant. 

As the writer of a recent work has affirmed, 
that the vert is the primitive part of speech, and 
that every sentence is a factitious word, it may 
be here noticed, that a few hints on the same sub- 
jects, but espousing contrary doctrines, will be 
found in the following pages. The Author con- 
ceives it hardly requisite to mention, that the 
remarks on sceptical philosophy have no reference 
whatever to the above writer. 



CONTENTS 



CHAP. I. 

Page 
Notices in the Scriptures respecting certain facts, as per- 
taining to the arts and sciences — their differences— the 
ends which they are calculated to promote — object of 
the following Treatise — to discourse on the Nature and 
Philosophy of Language, as connected with the Sacred 
Scriptures — author of the " Diversions of Purley" — the 
noun — verb, and its " peculiar differential circumstance," 
&c. — tjhe philosophy of Horne Tooke not favourable to 
the inquiry respecting the verb* — destruction of the MSS. 
of Horne Tooke, and the probable conclusion to be 
drawn from the circumstance — the opinions of other 
writers respecting the primitive part of speech — the ob- 
ject of the present Treatise more fully stated, and the 
plan for pursuing the inquiry laid down «• 1 

CHAP. II. 

Faculties and powers of the inferior animals — those of 
mankind — the progressive state of man — the perceptive 
faculty of an infant, and that of other animals — their 
ends essentially different — instinct and intellect— in^- 
stinctive signs not analogous to language » 7 

CHAP. III. 

Comparison between the perceptive faculty, as observable 
in an infant or child, with the same faculty in the adult 
— example drawn from a view of objects at sea — eluci- 
dation of three elementary parts of speech — five parts 
of speech elucidated by four balls — conceptions of 
novelty as giving birth to the expression of ideas — their 
differences — substantive the primitive part of speech — 
correspondence of the argument with that of Locke and 
the Bishop of Worcester respecting substance— trans- 
positive idiom of language affording an additional argu- 



VI CONTENTS. 

Page 

nn ut in favour of the hypothesis — the verb consequently 
not the primitive — the theory embracing such a doctrine 
proved to be false - - - - 13 

CHAP. IV. 

The nature of the verb — its being, action, &c. — time — pre- 
liminary elucidations deduced from the action and re- 
action of balls — metaphysical science recommended — 
verb the life of language, but not the cause of the exist- 
ence of the substantive — atheistical philosophy — an ex- 
position of its absurdities recommended, as subsidiary to 
the theory for unfolding the force and application of the 
verb ---_-_ 21 

CHAP. V. 

Grotius — Locke — Bichat — Morgan — Lawrence — Rennell 
— true philosophy — body — soul — leading faculties of 
the soul — passions — Aristotle — Cicero — three distinct 
faculties of the soul — the soul nevertheless undivided — 
metaphysical writers — their inaccurate definitions of the 
passions — lecturer of Trinity College, Dublin — Dr. 
Hutcheson — no exciting reason previous to affection 
and instinct — excitement to the faculty of judging de- 
pendent on the will — Locke's definition of passion proved 
to be incorrect — appetite — affection — passions — defini- 
tions ------ 24 

CHAP. VI. 

Locke's notion of matter and substance — controversy be- 
tween Locke and the Bishop of Worcester — the infer- 
ence of Locke shewn to be the highest probability and 
opinion ; that of the Bishop of Worcester, the demon- 
stration and certainty, that " the thinking thing in us is 
immaterial" — argument of modern chemists confuted — 
the commencement of the study of philosophy and true 
theoretic science aided by the light of Revelation 37 

CHAP. VII. 

Opinion that if Home Tooke had pursued the same course 
of reasoning as Locke had done, respecting fundamental 
doctrines, he would then have been able to answer his 
own query respecting the substantive and the verb — ap- 



CONTENTS. Vll 

Page 
plication of the two preceding chapters to the question 
of Home Tooke — none else than the first cause can 

Say I HAVE EXISTENCE IN OR WITH MY ESSENCE — 

inference and exemplification of the nature of the arti- 
ficial verb and definition — elucidation of five elementary 
parts of speech and the use of the article and other re- 
strictives — the use of supernumerary particles when rea- 
soning on the simple proposition - 44 

CHAP. VIII. 

Question, whether or not the English grammar should be 
formed on the Latin plan — opinions of grammarians re- 
specting the six cases — objections answered — the au- 
thors of the Eton Latin Grammar have proceeded upon 
the supposition that the Latin can be taught in connexion 
with the English grammar — Latin neuter nouns, &c. — 
elucidations of the English genitive — accentuation and 
the union of the parts of speech which stand for the Eng- 
lish of Latin nouns — Latin prepositions — tenses of the 
verb - - - - - 56 

CHAP. IX. 

Sentences — the opinion that every sentence is a factitious 
word controverted — Burke — the unity essential to a 
thinking being is not requisite to the operations of a 
thinking being — ellipsis of the verb " to be" — sentences 
of childhood — opinion that the imperatives, go, hark, &c. 
are virtual sentences — this opinion controverted — order 
of words analogous to the operations of intellect — eluci- 
dations — and conclusion of the argument - 75 

CHAP. X. 

Question respecting the origin of language — was it invented 
by man, or was it revealed to him by his Creator ? — 
atheistical philosophy — remarks of Johnson — Selkirk — 
Juan Fernandez — the young man caught in the woods of 
Hanover — in France — arguments drawn from these cir- 
cumstances, and from Genesis, chap. 1. — the knowledge 
and use of any language to be improved by an acquaint- 
ance with other languages — primitive language — the 
Scriptures afford the safest arguments respecting the 
transmission of it — writers on this subject not cor- 
responding in their opinions— the claims of different na- 



tiii CONTENTS. 

Page 
tions — Arabians — Syrians — Ethiopians — Armenians 
and the Jews — etymology of names considered — the 
name of Babel — and the names which are assigned by 
Moses td eastern countries, &c. — proved by Mr. Maurice 
to be the veiy names by which they were anciently 
known over all the east - - 91 

CHAP. XI. 

No notice in the sacred records respecting the primitive 
tongue — arguments of various writers stated— proba- 
bility that all the people of the earth journeyed and set- 
tled in the plains of Shinar — division of the people of all 
the earth — remark of Shuckford respecting the Baby- 
lonian and Hebrew language — answered by a passage 
in Jeremiah, &c. — alphabetic writing — writings of Job — 
language of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob - 99 

CHAP. XII. 

Causes of the fluctuation of language stated — language of 
the Israelites neither spoken nor generally understood in 
-Egypt at the time of the famine — the marriages of Joseph 
and Moses with Egyptian women — the friendship which 
possibly subsisted between the Israelites and the Egyp- 
tians until the death of Joseph — the mixed multitude 
which departed from Egypt — the language in which the 
written laAV was promulgated on Mount Sinai different 
from the language of the original or former sons of 
Eber — from the time of the captivity the Hebrew ceased 
to be a living language - 108 



ANTI-SCEPTICISM ; 



An INQUIRY into the NATURE and PHILOSOPHY of LAN- 
GUAGE, as connected with the SACRED SCRIPTURES, 



CHAP. I.— Sec. I. 

Notices in the Scriptures respecting certain facts, as pertaining to the 
arts and sciences — their differences — the ends which they are cal- 
culated to promote — object of the following Treatise — to discourse on 
the Nature and Philosophy of Language, as connected with the 
Sacred Scriptures — author of the " Diversions of Purley" — the noun 
---verb, and its " peculiar differential circumstance," &c. — the philo- 
sophy of Home Tooke not favourable to the inquiry respecting the 
verb — destruction of the MSS. of Home Tooke, and the probable 
conclusion to be drawn from the circumstance — the opinions of other 
writers respecting the primitive part of speech — the object of the 
present Treatise more fully stated, and the plan for pursuing the 
inquiry laid down. 

ALL the circumstances and relations, which are inci- 
dentally mentioned in the sacred records respecting 
contemporary manners and the arts and sciences, are, 
unquestionably, calculated to assist and strengthen the 
intellectual energies of man. But the intimations and 
relations which we find in those sacred stores are of a 
two-fold nature. They are divisible into those which are 
essential to the necessities and comforts of man in this 
lower world, and into those which have reference more 
particularly to his being and happiness in that which is to 
come. The former may be viewed as so many relations 
of facts, which were addressed immediately to the exter- 
nal senses at the time those facts are recorded to have 
taken place ; and this knowledge, the sound philosopher 
believes could not, at so early a period of the creation, 



Z anti-scepticism; on, 

have been acquired by unassisted reason. Such, among 
others, are the relations respecting language, husbandry, 
the reduction of metals, and metal! urgic science : while 
the latter, viz. those intimations which concern the hap- 
piness of man in a future state, were designed more pe- 
culiarly to stimulate the nobler faculties of the mind, 
and were further intended for reproof and for in- 
struction ; such are the intimations in Genesis, Joshua, 
Isaiah, &c. respecting the sun,* and the token of the 



* Sun stand thou still, &c. Josh. x. 12. It is remarkable, that the 
terms in which this event is recorded in the sacred writings, do not 
agree with what is now known concerning the motions of the heavenly 
bodies ; for whereas it is recorded, that the sun and moon were made 
to stop for a whole day, it is now sufficiently known that day and 
night are not caused by any motion of the sun, but by the rotation 
of the earth on its own axis. It should be remembered, however, 
that as in those early ages men had not the slightest notion of the 
modern discoveries in astronomy, it was unavoidably necessary that 
the event should be described according to the knowledge then ob- 
tained. If God had dictated to Joshua to record the miracle in terms 
suitable to the modern discoveries in astronomy, Joshua would have 
appeared to express it in a manner directly contrary to all the rules of 
science then known: and his account of what had happened would 
have been objected to as false in astronomy. It would have appeared 
rather a wild fancy, or a gross blunder of his own, than a true account 
of a real miracle ; and so would have been received with little atten- 
tion by the persons for whom it was written. Thus when God directed 
Joshua to record this miracle, he did not direct him to record it in a 
manner more agreeable to true astronomy ; because if he had done so, 
unless he inspired the world at the same time with a true knowledge 
of astronomy, the account would rather have tended to raise amongst 
those who read it and heard of it, disputes and " oppositions of science 
falsely so called/' than have promoted the great ends of religion in- 
tended by it.— Dr. Shuckford, D'Oyly and Mant's Bible. 

It has been observed that the Hebrew word (WDM) does not signify 
the sun, but the solar light ; thus God might, at the desire of Joshua, 
have so increased the refractive power of the atmosphere, that the 
light of the sun was observed long after the regular setting of that lu- 
minary ; in other words, the solar light remained on the earth, or figu- 
ratively " the sun stood still." God, by staying the departure of the 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 3 

covenant of Almighty God after the flood, the rain- 
bow;* recitals plainly conforming to the opinions and 
notions of the patriarchal ages : and such, likewise, are 
all the exact and perfect declarations respecting true 
philosophy and metaphysical science ; exhibiting to our 
minds the present weakness of our capacities, and offer- 
ing to us constant lessons of humility ; exciting in us 
feelings of industry to improve our knowledge and en- 
large our faculties, and finally, tending to fortify our minds 
against the violation of scepticism on the one hand, and 
spiritual pride on the other. Abstractedly considered, 
such, doubtless, is the two-fold meaning of all the scien- 
tific circumstances and intimations, illustrative of the 
opinions of the times, which are to be met with in Scrip- 
ture ; and which, to the highest degree, are interesting 
to students of every branch of sound, unsophisticated 
philosophy. Considered in a religious point of view, 
those relations are intimately connected with the internal 
evidences of the Bible. 

The object of the following Treatise is to discourse on 
one branch of science ; the Nature and Philosophy of 
Language, as connected with the Sacred Scriptures. 
During the inquiry, it shall be my endeavour to show, 
in opposition to sceptical philosophy, that the substan- 
tive, and not the verb, is the primitive part of speech ; 

sun's light, exposed to the Hebrews the Philistines' folly in attributing 
omnipotence to a body which could be arrested at the pleasure of a 
superior power. — Encyclopaedia Metropolitana. 

* It is not at all necessary to inquire whether there was or was not 
any rainbow before the flood. Upon either supposition the Divine 
Wisdom is very apparent, in appointing the rainbow for a token of his 
covenant and a memorial of his promise, that as often as men should 
see it, they might remember, that God had given them such a promise, 
and that his infallible word should be their sufficient security. — Dr. 
Waterland, WOyly and Manfs Bible. 

B 2 



i- anti-scepticism; on, 

and, consequently, that it is that into which every one of 
the rest is more easily to be resolved : " And Adam gave 
names to all cattle, and to the fowl of the air, and to 
every beast of the field." 

In my attempt to unfold the office and character of 
the verb, I shall endeavour to expose some of the prin- 
ciples and doctrines of Materialism, Atheistical and 
Sceptical Philosophy, and to offer one or two remarks 
on the nature of the passions. To this I shall add a few 
suggestions respecting grammar; a few hints concerning 
the formation of sentences, as connected with the state 
and progress of thought; and, finally, in conjunction 
with arguments deduced from the sacred authority of 
Scripture, an inquiry relating to the primitive language, 
the changes and diversity of tongues. 



CHAP. I.— Sec II. 

It is singular, that the author of the " Diversions of 
Purley," should have traced every part of speech to its 
original source, and in the structure of language marked 
the precise boundaries of each, and yet that he should 
have affirmed the verb to be something more than the 
noun : so that while he separated the rest of the parts of 
speech from their root, he suffered the verb to remain in 
quiet possession of the "peculiar differential circum- 
stance" which he conceived it to inherit over and above 
the noun, the primitive part of speech or root. Prepa- 
ratory to his Philological Diversions, had Home Tooke 
permitted himself to investigate the natural progress of 
his own thoughts, had he derived his philosophy from 
its true and genuine source, had his mind been engaged 



AN INQUIRY, &C 5 

in subjects connected with himself, his fellow beings, 
and his God, the true, the only philosophical root and 
cause of all things, — had this been the order of the study 
of Home Tooke, no man, whose philosophy and meta- 
physics are sound, will deny that there would have been 
a greater probability of the philologist's success in as- 
signing to the verb what he termed " its peculiar differ- 
ential circumstance :" he would probably have been en- 
abled to assign to the verb its proper station in common 
with the rest of the parts of speech, and thus have se- 
parated it from its root. 

It appears, however, clear, that the philosophy of 
Home Tooke was not so humiliating to his species as 
that of some of his contemporaries, and others who have 
survived him. But in point of talent, it is almost a pro- 
fanation of every sort of justice to compare this indi- 
vidual with any of those persons who held the same doc- 
trines in common with himself. While, therefore, it is 
to be acknowledged, that the author of the Diversions 
of Purley was avowedly a friend to all the wild and de- 
structive schemes of liberty which have since continued 
to poison and infest the minds of the ignorant, the 
wretched, and the depraved, still I contend, that the 
principles of Home Tooke were not so degrading to 
human nature as those of certain of his contemporaries. 
Whatever may have been his notions of Revealed Re- 
ligion, and however he may have promulgated them 
amongst the circle of his acquaintance, — as far as the 
individual circumstance extends of his not having in 
writing transmitted heretical opinions, thus far, I say, 
his reputation is not " damned to everlasting fame." In 
attributing to the noun the right of being called the pri- 
mitive part of speech, he necessarily acknowledged the 



i> WTr-SCF.PTK'lSM, OR, 

declaration of the sacred writings on this point to be 
correct. I am not qualified to affirm, that he was 
pleased at this coincidence, or as some have supposed, 
that he was led to, and was strengthened in the opinion 
from a consideration of the controversy between the 
Bishop of Worcester and Locke, respecting innate 
ideas ! For my own part, I cannot see what connexion 
subsists between the doctrines respecting innate ideas, 
and the question concerning the primitive part of speech. 
Home Tooke was of opinion, that the noun was the pri- 
mitive root of all the other parts of speech : and this 
opinion is undoubtedly supported by the authority of the 
well-known passage in the 2nd chapter of Genesis : — 
" And Adam gave names to all cattle, and to the fowl of 
the air, and to every beast of the field." But independ- 
ently of this coincidence, as proving that the judgment 
of Home Tooke was hardly so degraded as that of his 
party, we have tolerably good grounds for hoping, that 
feelings of conviction struck the mind of this philosopher 
during the latter period of his life : when he was led to 
burn his manuscript writings, and communicate to his 
friend, that " he was preparing for a long journey."* 

* About a fortnight before the death of Home Tooke, Mr. Whitwell, 
the architect, informed me of his friend's calling upon the author of 
"Evea TLrepoe vTa, when he found him busily employed in burning his 
manuscript writings. These writings were of such number and magni- 
tude as to occupy the whole of the morning before they were consumed. 
Having been asked what he was about, — after a pause of some time, 
Home Tooke replied—" I am preparing for a long journey." " This 
was accompanied with a manner so deeply impressive, that I shall 
never forget it," said the friend of Mr. Whitwell : he stated, that seve- 
ral times during his stay he was obliged to retreat from the fire-place, 
in consequence of the heat which the blaze of the papers occasioned, 
and that the eye of Home Tooke was alternately riveted on them and 
him, anxiously waiting the destruction of the writings, and seemingly 
fearful lest his friend should secrete any of them. It is supposed, that 



AN INOUIRY, &C. 7 

But if it be considered strange for Home Tooke to 
have affirmed, that verbs, as well as the other parts of 
speech, are nouns, and that a verb is something more 
than a noun ; and that the title of verb was given to it 
on account of that distinguishing something more than 
mere nouns convey, — it seems, to me, at least, equally 
strange that writers, who cannot be suspected for one 
moment of being sceptical in their opinions, should have 
broached theories in order to prove, that the verb, and 
not the noun, is the primitive or root of all the other 
parts of speech. It is perfectly unnecessary to enumerate 
the names of these writers, or to enter minutely into their 
arguments merely for the sake of confuting them. One 
of the objects of this Treatise will be secured, by stating 
my own reasons for believing, that the noun, and not the 
verb, is the original or primitive root, whence every 
other part of speech is derived. 

For this purpose, and to form an adequate notion of 
language, and its rise and progress to the grammatical 
structure of a sentence, it seems requisite to contemplate 
the nature of man in particular situations ; first in his 
infancy, and secondly in some selected instance of his 
state in riper years. 

m 

CHAP. II. 

Faculties and powers of the inferior animals — those of mankind — the 
progressive state of man — the perceptive faculty of an infant, and 
that of other animals — their ends essentially different — instinct and 
intellect — instinctive signs not analogous to language. 

X HE finger of nature operates on the senses of infants^ 
in common with all animal bodies, by painful or plea- 

au unpublished volume of "Enta YiTtpoivra, or " Diversions of Purley," 
perished in the flames. 



8 anti-scepticism; or, 

surable sensations : and every animal capable of ex- 
pressing sound, makes known the degree of his sensation 
by appropriate signs of consonance or dissonance. But 
the Creator has limited the faculties and powers of the in- 
ferior animals : he has attached to them peculiar instincts, 
by which they are enabled to execute, with exactness 
and precision, every work allotted to their natures ; and 
a very short period perfects the end of their existence. 
The state of man is far different; destined for nobler 
purposes, his form and habits are progressive. Many of 
the instinctive powers common to other animals, are de- 
signedly withheld from him, and the free exercise of 
those which are intellectual is substituted in their stead. 
A larger portion of time is, therefore, requisite for the 
developement of the faculties of man. On his entrance 
into the world, he is more helpless than other animals : 
and tears and cries demonstrate both the imbecility of 
his nature, and the acuteness of his animal feeling. His 
first sensation is that of pain : but no sooner is he re- 
lieved, than he sinks almost into a state of apathy. At 
this period his being may be called mere animal life : his 
intellectual existence is but in embryo. Thus almost 
insensible, and altogether helpless, does he recline, till 
disease, corporal pain, or the sensations of hunger, again 
call him to action ; when the fond caresses of a watchful 
parent yield to him nurture and support. If pain be the 
first sensation of an infant, it is equally true, that the in- 
cessant care of a mother will soon create in it even an- 
other feeling. While the child is hanging at her breast, 
ask the mother what her feelings are, what the sensations 
of her babe : — she will tell you they are those of pleasure 
and delight. The sympathetic glow of nature reverbe- 
rates from each content and pleasure: and while the 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 9 

infant sinks to slumber and repose, the mother breathes 
her joy, and sings forth hymns of praise. 

The remarks of Bishop Butler conduce much to the 
purpose of this discussion, and are deeply philosophical. 
*•' Nature," says this learned prelate, " does in no wise 
qualify us wholly, much less at once, for a mature state 
of life. Even maturity of understanding and bodily 
strength, are not only arrived to gradually, but are also 
very much owing to the continued exercise of our 
powers of body and mind from infancy. But if we sup- 
pose a person brought into the world with both these in 
maturity, as far as this is conceivable, he would plainly 
at first be as unqualified for the human life of mature 
age as an ideot. He would be in a manner distracted 
with astonishment, and apprehension, and curiosity, and 
suspense; nor can one guess how long it would be before 
he would be familiarised to himself and the objects about 
him enough, even to set himself to any thing. It may be 
questioned too, whether the natural information of his 
sight and hearing, would be of any manner of use at all 
to him in acting, before experience. And it seems, that 
men would be strangely headstrong and self-willed, and 
disposed to exert themselves with an impetuosity, which 
would render society insupportable, and the living in it 
unpracticable, were it not for some acquired moderation 
and self-government, some aptitude and readiness in re- 
straining themselves, and concealing their sense of things. 
Want of every thing of this kind which is learnt, would 
render a man as uncapable of society, as want of lan- 
guage would : or as his natural ignorance of any of the 
particular employments of life, would render him unca- 
pable of providing himself with the common conveni- 
ences, or supplying the necessary wants of it. In these 



10 anti-scepticism; or, 

respects, and probably in many more, of which we have 
no particular notion, mankind is left by nature an un- 
formed, unfinished creature; utterly deficient and un- 
qualified, before the acquirement of knowledge, experi- 
ence, and habits, for that mature state of life which was 
the end of his creation, considering him as only related 
to this world."* 

It is very certain that according to the accounts of 
nurses, and those concerned in the management of 
children, an infant does not, as it is termed, " begin to 
take notice," until after the age of four or five weeks ; 
and the first objects which he perceives are his own hands. 
From that period, provided the infant continue in health, 
the mental faculties of perceiving, thinking, reasoning, 
knowing, and every other faculty connected with the 
powers of reflexion, are uniformly progressive. The first 
of these faculties, viz. perception, upon which the other 
faculties depend, seems, therefore, to remain for a consi- 
derable time in a state of quiescence. This is an inte- 
resting circumstance, and appears to be, in some degree, 
connected with the philosophy of speech. The senses 
are the great originals of all our simple ideas of external 
objects; and by these the faculties of reflexion are in- 
fluenced and exerted. By what means body and soul 
are united, and how, through the medium of the outward 
organs of sense, the mind receives its impressions, are 
questions too delicate and abstruse to be comprehended 
and answered by man. His nature, however prominent 
in ability, feels itself incompetent to the task; it hesitates, 
and presently shrinks beneath the inquiry: " better to 
bless the sun than reason how it shines."f The material 

* Bishop Butler's Analogy, part 1, chap, 5, sec. 3. t Ford. 



AN INQUIRY, &C. I 11 

and immaterial parts of man, however, are admirably 
fitted to act occasionally in unison; and in various situa- 
tions of his being, they are so constructed as to be very 
much influenced by each other. These are truths self- 
evident in nature, and they give to science and philoso- 
phy an antecedent proposition, by which one may be 
enabled to reason on the probable cause of the quiescent 
state of the mind of an infant; and from which the sound 
philologist may be enabled to draw a reasonable hypo- 
thesis concerning the original part of speech, and the 
philosophy of language. At this early period of their 
being, the difference between the state of man and that 
of the inferior creature, is very striking. The percep- 
tive faculty of our species does not manifest itself near 
so* soon as the perceptive faculty of other animals ; but 
the developement of this one faculty in the infant, evinces 
to my mind, the boundaries of instinct, and reveals thejirst 
dawn of intellect and reason. The immediate and peculiar 
cares of the dam for her offspring are very soon dis- 
missed, and are at an end. The young is soon enabled to 
protect and help himself; he feels no actual want, but that 
which is absolutely requisite for the duration or con- 
tinuance of himself and species. It is true he sees sur- 
rounding objects and is pleased; he plays and frisks 
before them : but these are altogether distinct from his 
necessities ; they are not in any degree essential to his 
real happiness. Take away the object of his play and 
gambol, is he irreconcilable ? No : — however suddenly 
removed, he neither laments, bemoans, nor does he be- 
tray the least uneasiness of sensation. The perceptive 
faculty of the infant leads to a very different end : after 
a certain period, he begins to notice certain casual ob- 
jects ; — at their approach he feels delight ; he soon se- 



12 anti-scepticism; or, 

lects a favourite one ; he calls, Mamma ! and points, and 
signifies by signs his wish to have it. Its removal cre- 
ates uneasy feeling : he cries. 

The devclopement of this faculty seems, to me, to be 
the very beginning of intellect and language. The 
casual object, which is here described as being presented 
to the eyes of the child, and exciting in him pleasurable 
feelings, was not (as the term " casual" implies) antici- 
pated by any uneasiness of sensation, it was actually 
present, as it were, by accident, it instantly gave the 
pleasure, and its removal instantly caused a sensation of 
pain and the expression of it. As, therefore, the na- 
tures of the inferior animals are stationary, and the 
faculties of man progressive, it follows, that the signs of 
sensation in the one will be soon fixed and determined : 
and the instinctive voices and gestures of man will be 
modified by the progress which he makes in the right 
use of his reason and intellect. Thus the various bleat- 
ing of the sheep is as conversably familiar to his kind, 
as the pur or the mew is to the species of the domestic 
cat ; and these are fixed and unalterable in their quali- 
ties. But the laughing and crying of man, both as to 
their meaning and expression, undergo distinct modifi- 
cations. At first, as in the infant, they are symbols of 
sympathy and social affection. In his early stages, the 
uneasy sensations of hunger or bodily pain, may excite 
the softer expression of weeping; but no sooner has he 
grown in years, than similar causes, even to torture, 
pain, and death, cease to draw a tear; and thus sighs 
and groans suppressed, indicate the triumph of spirit 
over matter. 

In forming the conclusion, that the developement of 
the faculty of perception in a child, is the very beginning 



AN INQUIRt, &C. 13 

of intellect and language, it seems requisite to bear in 
mind how far, in their early stages of being, the state 
of the human species and that of the brute creation are 
analogous: and also to recollect, that instinctive signs 
bear no resemblance whatever to language : for the signs 
of language or parts of speech are conventional: they are 
agreed upon by the mutual and respective compact of 
individual nations throughout the world: the signs of 
instinct are not conventional, they are not agreed upon 
by compact, but are fixed and determined throughout 
the whole of every species according to the particular 
and uncontrollable laws of nature : and are supposed to 
have been so ever since the beginning of the creation. 



CHAP. III. 

Comparison between the perceptive faculty, as observable in an infant 
or child, with the same faculty in the adult — example drawn from a 
view of objects at sea — elucidation of three elementary parts of 
speech— five parts of speech elucidated by four balls — conceptions of 
novelty as giving birth to the expression of ideas — their differences — 
substantive the primitive part of speech — correspondence of the ar- 
gument with that of Locke and the Bishop of Worcester respecting 
substance — transpositive idiom of language affording an additional 
argument in favour of the hypothesis — the verb consequently not the 
primitive — the theory embracing such a doctrine proved to be false. 

IT is perfectly consistent with just reasoning to com- 
pare the first operation of the perceptive faculty of a 
child, recognizing indistinctly the few or many objects 
around him, with the operation of the same faculty in a 
man, viewing indistinctly a few or many objects at a dis- 
tance. The results arising from every man's own indi- 
vidual experience will convince him, that his notions 
concerning objects which appear foreign to his senses, 
will be either restrained or enlarged in proportion to 



H anti-scepticism; or, 

their proximity or remoteness. This is peculiarly evi- 
denced at sea by sailors on their first notice of an island, 
and their gradual approaches towards it. Or, perhaps, 
the analogy now proposed will appear stronger, were we 
to imagine a fleet or sail of ships, closely moving toge- 
ther, to be just observable to the naked eye of an indivi- 
dual on a desart island. The whole might seem as 
one only: — one object. Now let me put the question: 
At the instant of their observing the fleet or sail of ships, 
what would be the idea passing in the minds of the be- 
holders, who are supposed to be ignorant as to the real 
state or quality of the object. What would be the 
thought or character imprinted on the mind of an indi- 
vidual person so situated ? We are not long in deter- 
mining that the meaning "which we attach to the part of 
speech, object, or thing, would be fitly correspondent to 
the meaning of that outward sign, expression, or part of 
speech, which such an individual would use to commu- 
nicate the purport of his conception of the fleet. We 
will next imagine this fleet, designated by the sign, ob- 
ject, or things to have approached sufficiently near to be 
discovered by the naked eye, as consisting of a number 
of separate objects or things ; till at length they appear 
of different dimensions. The question again returns : — 
What would be the ideas passing in the mind of the be- 
holder, and the outward signs of communication which 
he would use to correspond with his increased ideas? 
Would not the meaning of the signs correspond with 
the meaning which we attach to the qualities, or adjec- 
tives, or parts of speech, large and small ? The affirma- 
tive being granted, we suppose him to join the signs 
large and small, to the former sign object, making toge- 
ther object large or large object— object small or small ob- 



AN INQUIRY, &C 15 

ject. Of these interchanges it may be just remarked, 
that they evidently point out a difference of meaning. 
In the one instance, viz. object large, an affirmation is 
made respecting the thing or object ; in the other, viz. 
large object, (according to the English idiom) an affirma- 
tion is not made : large object is a mere name, a mark or 
sign of an idea, and nothing else. This I shall endea- 
vour to explain in its proper place. But suppose the 
person to have discovered the moving of the object, 
(presupposing that he was before conscious of the state 
of not moving, but which, perhaps, is not very good 
reasoning), before he noticed it to have consisted of a 
number of separate objects : the current idea in his mind, 
in this (supposed) case, would entirely correspond with 
the meaning which we affix to the word moving. Object 
moving or moving object. The same remarks respecting 
the interchanges are applicable as before; viz. that in 
the one instance an affirmation is made, in the other 
that an affirmation is not made : and that all these signs, 
large, small, and moving, are signs of " qualities, modes, 
or accidents .-" but the last sign or part of speech exhi- 
bits a relation very different from that of large or small. 
These are attributes of the object or thing; moving is 
not : it is an instance of the same object or thing with 
all its attributes in the state of moving. But we will sup- 
pose the vessels to have now arrived, and the beholders 
to be viewing with wonder and astonishment the stu- 
pendous machinery — the variety of stores; — to be ob- 
serving the qualities, size, make, shape, colour, teint, and 
shade of the things. No sooner have their wonder and 
their admiration subsided, than they begin to mark the 
fitness of each to some particular end ; and, in order that 
they may reason upon their various properties and uses, 



IS anti-scepticism; or, 

without the labour and inconvenience of resorting to 
violent gesticulation, they adopt oral distinctions. Ap- 
propriate signs are very soon invented to correspond 
with the various qualities, and these are added as before 
to the term thing already fixed upon : the latter of 
which, in the course of time, becomes obsolete, and the 
former is agreed upon by mutual compact to be the sign, 
type, or name, of the particular object or thing. — " To 
assign names to surrounding objects," says Dr. Crombie, 
" would be ^he first care of barbarous nations ; their 
next essay would be to express their most common 
actions or states of being. This, indeed, is the order of 
nature — the progress of intellect." * 

Two balls, of equal size and colour, placed upon a 
table, will serve for further elucidation. Two adjectives, 
small and red, explain the size and colour of the balls : 
and, as far as both adjectives are concerned, what is true 
of the one is true of the other. But one of the balls is 
seen to move, while the other remains stationary : here, 
then, is a new relation. The ball moving or the moving 
ball : and the ball remaining or resting, or the remaining 
or resting ball. The moving ball is seen to strike the 
resting ball : here we have another relation, or passive 
state of the thing or object : a third ball is now intro- 
duced, which is observed to move swifter than the other 
moving ball: and now another relation is discovered: 
the manner of the moving. Let it now be supposed that 
the three balls are stationary. I take one of them, and, 
placing it closely to one of the remaining, set it in mo- 
tion towards the other. The spectator observes another 
relation, viz. moving to one, and moving from the other; 

* Dr. Crombie's Treatise on the Etymology and Syntax of the English 
Language. 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 17 

so that to and from are middle terms, appearing to be- 
long to one ball as much as to the other ; yet we can 
distinctly trace an adjective meaning in both ; viz. the 
fo-inoving-ball and theyhwrc-moving-ball. Let it again 
be supposed, that the balls are at rest, and that a fourth 
ball is introduced moving. We now observe the relation 
of time ; the present-moving-baN, and the past-moving- 
ball : and here might be developed the various relations 
oF the tenses of a verb. 

Novelty is the most natural feeling of the mind ; and 
the faculty by which we discover the objects of novelty 
is called judgment. The business of the judgment is that 
of discovering differences. In the very threshold of the 
philosophy of language, this faculty, though in a state of 
infancy, exerts its influence : the conceptions of novelty 
give birth to the expression of ideas, to the various mo- 
difications of them, and to all the signs and characteristic 
marks of the qualities of their differences, whether they 
be the mode and manner of their being, acting, or suf- 
fering. 

It is now easy to conceive, that the substantive must 
have been the original part of speech, and that, accord- 
ing to the nature and proportion of differences in sub- 
stantives, soon were invented the adjective, the verb, and 
the adverb : the thing or object being the substantive, 
and the " mode, accident, or quality," the adjective, 
verb, or adverb. And this corresponds- exactly with 
Locke's notion of substance, and agrees entirely with 
the conceptions of the Bishop of Worcester, who op- 
posed some of the passages in " The Essay of Human 
Understanding," in his discourse in vindication of the 
Trinity : where he says " we find we can have no true 
conception of any mode or accidents, but we must con- 

c 



IS anti-scepticism; or, 

ceivc a substratum or subject wherein they are: 
since it is a repugnancy to our conceptions of things, 
that modes or accidents should subsist by themselves." * 

As, therefore, the differences in the appearances of 
things or objects, in the infancy of language, were de- 
signated by the new sign signifying quality, so arose the 
adjective : and further, as the differences in the qualities 
of things or objects, at the next step towards the im- 
provement of language, were distinguished by another 
new sign, signifying being, acting, or suffering, so arose 
the verb : and what the adjective is to the substantive, 
so the adverb is to the verb : the adjective defines the 
quality of the substantive, the adverb defines the quality of 
the verb — that is to say, the state of the substantive. 

If we consider the nature of the transpositive idiom, 
the order of words as they occur in the construction of 
sentences in the Greek and Latin tongues, the present 
hypothesis will be furnished with an additional argu- 
ment in its favour. The nature of language will be then 
further unfolded to our view: the consideration will, 
moreover, present to us one of the principal causes which 
have influenced the alteration of language during the pro- 
gress of man's civilization. But we must traverse back, 
as before, to the most uncultivated period of society : 
and a short extract from the writings of Dr. Blair will 
not only answer our purpose, but also serve for general 
corroboration. 

" Let us figure to ourselves a savage, beholding some 
object, such as fruit, which he earnestly desires, and 
requests another to give him. Suppose him unacquainted 
with words: he would then strive to make himself un- 

* Bishop of Worcester, quoted in Lcrke's first Letter, page 41. 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 19 

derstood by pointing eagerly at the object which he de- 
sired, and uttering at the same time a passionate cry. 
Supposing him to have acquired words, the first word 
which he uttered would, consequently, be the name of 
that object. He would not express himself according 
to our order of construction, ' Give me fruit/ but ac- 
cording to the Latin order, ' Fruit give me,' — ' Fructum 
da mihi :' for this evident reason, that his attention was 
wholly directed towards fruit, the object of his desire. 
From hence," says Dr. Blair, " we might conclude, d 
priori, that this would be the order in which words were 
most commonly arranged in the infancy of language; 
and accordingly we find, in reality, that in this order 
words are arranged in most of the ancient tongues, as in 
the Greek and the Latin ; and it is said likewise, in the 
Russian, the Sclavonic, and Gaelic, and several of the 
American tongues." * 

If the arguments which I have adopted are just, then 
it undeniably follows, that the noun or adjective is the 
original or fundamental part of speech; and that the 
theory which embraces a principle to shew that the verb 
is the original part of speech, must be false ; not only 
because it sets forward upon the supposition that man, 
grown in intellect, contemplates the nature of his neces- 
sities, and so discovers, or endeavours to select such ob- 
jects as shall be likely to alleviate and satisfy them ; but 
because the supposition implies in itself an evident con- 
tradiction. The promulger of such a theory supposes that 
the want or desire of an individual is really the action of 
the verb in artificial language. But if this mode of reason- 
ing were accurate, the mere want or desire would not con- 

* Dr. Blair's Lectures. 
C2 



20 anti-scepticism; or, 

stitutc a part of speech or word ! nor a part of thought / 
Animal wants are occasioned by certain involuntary sen- 
sations ; and are wholly acts of instinct : words are volun- 
tary articulations; the primary object of which is in- 
tellectual communication. A man, who was born dumb, 
and who has since been taught to articulate, is actuated 
by feelings of want and desire; the inferior creatures are 
influenced by wants and desires in common with men ; 
and the inferior creatures are emphatically called dumb 
animals. But, let it be asked, who has ever accused the 
dumb man, or the inferior creature, of uttering a part of 
speech ? Such a theorist asserts, also, that in naming a 
person, we can have no idea of him but in a state of 
being, acting, or suffering ; therefore, he infers that the 
verb was antecedent to the substantive. Let it be re- 
torted : what idea can I or any man have of the state of 
the being, acting, or suffering of any thing independently 
of something? None: because "we can have no true 
conception of any mode or accidents, but we must con- 
ceive a SUBSTRATUM Ol' SUBJECT W T HEREIN THEY ARE."* 

To assert, therefore, that the verb is the original part of 
speech, i. e. that the verb is antecedent to the substantive, 
implies a contradiction. It is implying that a thing is 
before it is ; which is a manifest absurdity : " Nam quod 
non est agere non potest ; nee ipsa res esse potuit, ante- 
quam esset."f 

* Bishop of Worcester and Locke. t Grotius* 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 21 

CHAP. IV. 

The nature of the verb— its being, action, &c. — time — preliminary elu- 
cidations deduced from the action and re-action of balls — metaphy- 
sical science recommended — verb the life of language, but not the 
cause of the existence of the substantive— atheistical philosophy — an 
exposition of its absurdities recommended, as subsidiary to the theory 
for unfolding the force and application of the verb. 

IjET us next endeavour to unravel more fully the na- 
ture of the verb. The moving hall. Moving is evidently 
of the nature of an adjective ; but it is of a nature different 
from the adjectives red and hard. The red, hard ball. 
The movi?ig-r ed-h&rd-ba\\. Red and hard indicate two 
of the qualities of the ball; but moving points out the 
quality of its state. Let two of these balls be placed 
upon the table. Let one of them be gently struck; the 
relations before explained will be recognized. One is 
the moving ball, the other is the remaining or resting 
ball. Suppose the moving ball to be now destroyed; 
we perceive all its relations, which have been named, 
to be likewise destroyed. The mind, however, reflects 
upon its experience; and the memory dwells upon the 
state of the remaining ball, object, or thing. The 
mind remembers the expedient of adopting the op- 
posite term, moving, to that of resting. But the mind 
perceives, that, in this instance, it can discover no oppo- 
site term to that of remaining or resting ; it wants the 
substratum by which every mode or accident is said to be 
or exist : and something can have no relation to nothing. 
The nomen, or name, moving ball, however, is stored up 
in the memory. We now strike the remaining ball; 
and discover the quality or state of moving in this to be 
the same as that of the ball which is destroyed: we, 
therefore, reasonably conclude, that what is true of this 



anti-scepticism; or, 

was also true of the other. The difference between this 
and the name, moving ball, is now more apparent. The 
one is nomen substantivum, and the other simply nomen. 
Suppose the ball substans, or remaining, to be at rest : 
we now introduce another ball, moving ; this is perceived 
to strike the other. One is called the moxi?ig, the other 
the moved ball; but, in fact, each is both moved and 
movzVzo-; for motion has been given, and is still con- 
tinued, to both. — Before, therefore, we can arrive at any 
tolerable notion of the action of a verb, we feel the neces- 
sity of ascending a few steps higher than mere dead 
matter will carry us. Our reflexions must be concen- 
trated and exercised upon and about ourselves, our 
being, and existence. In performing this operation of 
the mind, we must be careful not to confound and blend 
appetite, passion, and intellect with language. Words 
and language are the vocal and articulated signs and 
transcriptions of our thoughts and ideas, by which we 
are enabled to communicate those thoughts and ideas to 
others. This is the true meaning and use of language 
or speech; than which there' is no other meaning ncr 
signification to be attached to the word. The verb may 
be called the life of language ; but the life of language 
must not be confounded with the materials, the mechan- 
ism, or the progress of language, any more than the 
intellectual life of man must be confounded with the 
material part of man. The blood which is the supposed 
vehicle of life in an animal, cannot exert itself as that 
vehicle without the power of motion ; the cause, there- 
fore, of that power of motion may be considered as the 
immediate cause of the life of an animal. The cause of 
this power is God. " He is the one supreme and per- 
fect Being — independent in his existence, infinite in his 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 23 

wisdom, eternal in his duration — the Author of all 
power, the Source of all life, the cause of all motion." * 
But the verb or life, as it has been called, of language, 
is not the cause of the existence of the substantive, or the 
substratrum, any more than the life of man is the cause of 
his corporeal being, or of his material organization, -f* 
To assert otherwise than this respecting language, is, 
according to Dr. Hales, to agree with the doctrine of 
" ancient and modern professors of atheistical philoso- 
phy ;" who represent " the faculty of articulate speech, 
or language, as the mere instinctive expression of the 
wants and desires of a herd of associated savages, gra- 



* Remarks on Scepticism, &c. by the Rev. T. Rennell, page 
124. 

f Neither is material organization the cause of the life of a man. 
" An organ is an instrument. Organization, therefore, is nothing 
more than a system of parts so constructed and arranged, as to co- 
operate to one common purpose. This orderly disposition of parts 
exists generally, though a particular part may be disturbed, after its 
subject has ceased to live. The ear is the organ of hearing, and its 
correspondence with the brain exists as much in the dead, as in the 
living body. Most of our knowledge, indeed, of this organization, 
or arrangement of parts, and how they co-operate and mutually 
support each other, has been derived from our observations upon 
the dead subject. Organization has been confounded with life, be- 
cause without organization, life, or the continuance of active exist- 
ence, is not to be found ; and because when organization in some 
particular parts is disturbed, active existence eeases. But because 
no musical sounds can be produced without an instrument, and be- 
cause if that instrument be disordered, those musical sounds cannot 
be elicited, no one would argue that a flute or a trumpet is a musical 
sound. The instrument may still remain, though not in a state of 
order sufficient to produce its effect ; and general organization may 
exist, though from a deficiency in one particular part, life has been 
extinguished. The rupture or disturbance of one single part, 
though it may put a stop to the activity, yet it does not necessarily 
violate the arrangement of the thousands which compose the animal 
body." — Remarks on Scepticism, &.c pages 80 and 81. 



|N ANTI-SCEPTICISM ; OR, 

dually invented for mutual convenience of communica- 
tion, and established by mutual consent."* 

To expose, therefore, the absurdities of atheistical 
and sceptical philosophy will promote our inquiries re- 
specting the nature of the verb, and enable us to an- 
swer the question of Home Tooke, f or rather to dis- 
tinguish the relation which the verb bears to the sub- 
stantive. This exposition is reserved for the discussion 
of two separate chapters. 



CHAP. V. 

Grotius — Locke — Bichat — Morgan— Lawrence— Renuell — true phi- 
losophy — body — soul — leading faculties of the soul — passions — 
Aristotle — Cicero — three distinct faculties of the soul — the soul 
nevertheless undivided — metaphysical writers — their inaccurate 
definitions of the passions— lecturer of Trinity College, Dublin — 
Dr. Hutcheson — no exciting reason previous to affection and in- 
stinct — excitement to the faculty of judging dependent on the 
will — Locke's definition of passion proved to be incorrect— appe- 
tite — affection — passions — definitions. 

JK,ES aliquas esse, quae esse cceperint, sensu ipso et 
confessione omnium constat. Eae autem res sibi non 
fuerunt causa ut essent : nam quod non est agere non 
potest ; nee ipsa res esse potuit, antequam esset. Se- 
quitur igitur, ut aliunde habuerint sui originem ; quod 
non tantiim de illis rebus, quas ipsi aut conspicimus aut 
conspeximus, fatendum est ; sed et de iis, unde ilia? or- 
tum habent; donee tandem ad aliquam causam per- 
veniamus, quae esse nunquam cceperit : quasque sit, ut 
loqui solemus, non contingenter, sed necessarid. Hoc 

* Dr. Hales, D'Oyly and ManVs Bible. 

f " What is that peculiar differential circumstance, which, added 
to the definition of a noun, constitutes a verb ?" 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 25 

autem, qualecunque tandem sit, id ipsum est, quod 
Numinis aut Dei voce significatur. — H. Grot ins De Yer. 
Mel. Chris. 

" Every thing" says Locke, " that has a beginning 
must .have a cause ', — it is a true principle of reason, or a 
proposition certainly true ; which we come to know by 
contemplating our ideas, and perceiving that the idea of 
beginning to be is necessarily connected with the idea of 
some operation, and the idea of operation, with the idea 
of something operating, which we call a cause ; and so 
the beginning to be, is perceived to agree with the idea 
of a cause, as is expressed in the proposition ; and thus 
it comes to be a certain proposition ; and so may be 
called a principle of reason, as every true proposition is 
to him that perceives the certainty of it." — Locke' s Jirst 
Letter to the Bishop of Worcester. 

From these passages we can easily suppose how the 
great Locke would have answered the doctrines of mo- 
dern sceptics respecting matter, and also their notions 
of the organization of matter as the cause of life. But 
the dogmas of M. Bichat, Sir T. C. Morgan, and Mr. 
Lawrence, have lately been very ably exposed. 

" Of these three gentlemen," say the Edinburgh 
Monthly Reviewers,* " M. Bichat is the only one who 
has intelligibly communicated his notions upon the sub- 
ject. If Mr. Lawrence understands the doctrine, he has 
been very unhappy in his reasonings upon it. But as for 
Sir T. C. Morgan, it will be quite plain to any one who 
will be so bold as to examine his writings, that he has 
adopted the doctrine without understanding it in any 
tolerable degree." 

* Number 13;— Article: Remarks on Scepticism, by RcnneU, 



26 anti-scepticism; or, 

M After confounding life and organization," continue 
the Reviewers, " these gentlemen very naturally proceed 
to confound matter and mind, body and soul. Mr. 
Lawrence very plainly declares himself satisfied that the 
brain is not merely the instrument by which the mind 
carries on its operations, but that it is of itself capable 
of thought ; and is, in fact, that which is called mind or 
soul. — To this ridiculous conclusion they have arrived 
from mere confusion of terms and definitions, and from 
totally neglecting to consider those distinctions between 
mind and matter, with which every ordinary man is fa- 
miliar." 

" Mr. Rennell first exposes the mistakes on the sub- 
ject of life into which M. Bichat has fallen. M. Bichat 
does not admit of any such thing as intellectual life. 
He has described life as of two kinds, organic and ani- 
mal. Organic life is that which, he says, is common to 
animals and vegetables; and the passions, he says, are 
among the functions of organic life. After quoting the 
passage in which those opinions are expressed, Mr. 
Rennell says:* — ' Thus, then, according to M. Bichat, 
a cabbage and a man, having the functions of organic 
life in common, and the passions being among those 
functions, it follows, that jealousy, anger, revenge, and 
love, are the common affections of the man and the 
cabbage. It will be seen, at a glance, that the fallacy 
consists in omitting to distinguish those passions, such 
as jealousy, anger, &c. which have their origin and gra- 
tification entirely in the mind, from those of sensuality, 
&c. which require the instrumentality of outward or- 
gans.' — " In another place," say the Edinburgh Monthly 

* Remarks on Scepticism, &c. page ZB. 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 27 

Reviewers, " M. Bichat attempts to shew, that the pas- 
sions are the result of our material organization, and 
that, therefore, they cannot be softened, nor their sphere 
contracted, because they are not under the influence of 
the will. And yet the very man who entertains this 
opinion, has asserted, that education may bestow such 
perfection on the judgment and reflection as to make 
them more powerful than the passions. Mr. Ren- 
nell having extracted both these passages, makes the fol- 
lowing excellent observations :" — Edinburgh Monthly 
Meviexv, No. 13. 

' The very exercise of this superior power of judg- 
ment and reflection must ultimately depend upon the 
will, as every man's self-experience will inform him : and 
if the impulse of the passions is thus subdued, it can 
only be by restraint, and where there is restraint, the 
sphere must be virtually contracted. As far, therefore, 
as the theory of M. Bichat is intelligible, it contains 
within itself a gross contradiction.' 

6 To such paltry sophistry, and such palpable absur- 
dities, are men of the highest professional eminence re- 
duced, when they would annihilate that first, that no- 
blest gift of God to man — The immortal Soul.'— Re- 
marks on Scepticism, page 59. 

The Creator, having fashioned man after his own 
image, and proclaimed the exalted purpose of his exist- 
ence, hath wisely ordained that a state of total inactivity 
shall not be conducive to happiness, or even temporary 
satisfaction. 

The true philosopher is persuaded that the body is 
mortal and that the soul is immortal ;* that, taken ab- 

* Since the Author of our being has planted no wandering passion in 
us, no desire which has not its object, futurity is the proper object of tha 



anti-scepticism; or, 

stractedly, the one is pure, and the other is impure, that 
the earthly part of man is grovelling, that it is a ma- 
chine, a mere engine to the reasoning part of him, in- 
terested in no one thing but appetite, present enjoy- 
ment, and self-preservation: and these it pursues as 
the greatest possible good ! — while the other, qualified 
with memory and reflection, reason and judgment, affec- 
tion, love, and hope, contemplates, with joy, the design 
and use of its present existence ; it feels that this lower 
world is not to be its resting place ; that it is destined for 
some nobler end. Man, therefore, is endowed with in- 
tellectual susceptibility, that he may mark the changes of 
his nature and the vicissitudes of human life; that he 
may dignify his manners with rectitude of conduct, and 
so fit the soul for future emancipation. 

The principal or leading faculties of the soul are, 
perhaps, better displayed by some of the Christian 
Fathers,* than by either Aristotle or Cicero. In treat- 
ing of the passions, Aristotle considered only the out- 
ward circumstances of them ; and the remarks of Cicero, 
in discoursing of the power and nature of the mind, evi- 
dently shew, that with the passions he blended the appe- 
tites; for, in his Offices, wrath, lust, fear, and pleasure, 
have been indiscriminately called by him passions. 

While the memory, the understanding, and the will, 

passion so constantly exercised about it ; and this restlessness in the 
present, this assigning ourselves over to farther stages of duration, this 
successive grasping at somewhat still to come, appears to me a kind of 
instinct or natural symptom, which the mind of man has of its own im- 
mortality. — Addison. 

* Now when I turn my eyes inward, says St. Bernard., I discover 
three distinct faculties in my soul, whereby I am qualified to remember, 
and contemplate, and desire God — these are the memory, the under- 
standing, and the will : et seq.— Vide chap. 1, St. Bernard's Book of the 
Soul. 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 29 

are to be regarded as three distinct faculties, by which 
we remember, contemplate, and desire, we must be sen- 
sible, that these powers cannot be separated from one 
another, and that, consequently, there can be no abso- 
lute division in the soul itself; for it is the whole soul 
which exercises these faculties, the whole soul which 
wills or imagines, understands or remembers. 

But writers on metaphysical science have not given 
very accurate definitions of the passions. Independently 
of their admission of the divine and separate principle of 
life, they are not more philosophic in their notions re- 
specting the passions than those who have transcribed 
the doctrines of materialism as promulgated by writers 
of the French school of infidelity. 

Excepting one or two, all the volumes with which we 
are acquainted do not, in this particular, seem to exem- 
plify any order or principle. In the middle of the last 
century, the lecturer of oratory on the foundation of 
Erasmus Smith, Esq. in Dublin, seemed to enter fully 
into these ideas, when he endeavoured to unravel per- 
plexities which modern metaphysicians had then thrown 
upon the performances of the ancients ; and if I am not 
insufficiently read in the present subject, Dr. Lawson 
was the first of the modern Professors of Rhetoric, who 
endeavoured to systematize the passions for the use of 
students in oratory. But while this tribute of attention 
is offered to the memory of the Lecturer of Trinity Col- 
lege exclusively, we must not enter into the ideas implied 
in the apology of the Doctor at the conclusion of the 
tenth lecture, expressly intimating not only that rheto- 
ricians had defined the passions imperfectly, but that 
moralists had fallen into similar negligences : that his 
ideas on the subject were completely new, and, therefore, 



30 anti-scepticism; or, 

that the theory would be viewed as an innovation, and 
so be liable to censure. Now this was evidently advanced 
to the exclusion of the disquisitions contained in the vo- 
luminous treatises of Dr. Hutcheson on the passions, the 
best, perhaps, extant : books which had been published 
only a few years before, and which caused controversy suf- 
ficient to produce ample illustrations of the moral sense ; 
books which prove to us, in direct terms, that there can be 
no exciting reason previously to affection, instinct, or the 
moral faculty; and that the conscience is distinct from 
the sense of moral good and evil ; so, we conclude that 
what taste is to natural discernment, conscience is to the 
moral sense, — improved by knowledge and care. 

The qualities or effects produced from the faculties of 
the soul might not unaptly be called volition, judgment, 
and knowledge.* Dr. Lawson defines passion to be the 
will acting with vehemence; but I think it appears 
pretty evident that passion is feeling, modified by intellect 
and the experience of sensation. " Writers," says Dr. 
Lawson, " agree in mentioning two faculties of the 
mind, of undoubted reality, and altogether different, 
the understanding and the will. Next after which they 
place, as different springs of action, the passions ; in this 
last, it seems, they are mistaken : for look into your own 
breasts," says the Doctor, " is not the case thus ? You 
apprehend a certain object to be good ; you instantly de- 
sire to obtain it ; if it be of much importance, vehe- 
mently. What then is will, what passion ? are they not 
the same operation, differing but in degree? For ob- 
serve, the general act of desiring we name willing ;f add 

* This is similar to the division of St. Bernard, 
t It was the opinion of Locke, that desiring and willing are two 
distinct acts of the mind. But his illustrations do not appear to be 



AN INQUIRY, &C 31 

hereto heat, ardour, it is passion. Passion then," says 
the Doctor, " is the will acting with vehemence." * Now 
to disprove the accuracy of this corrected definition, we 
need only refer to the faculties of volition, judgment, and 
knowledge. Independently of reason and experience, 
the first, " volition,'' includes only instinct and appetite, 
but, connected with them, it comprises every other mo- 
dification of feeling, from the calmest of all possible 
desire, to the most violent impetus of emotion, and 
astonishment, and every feeling of energetic passion; 
and however the second, "judgment" may be said to com- 
prehend abstract as well as concrete ideas, and to dis- 
cover differences, excitement to the faculty of judging is, 
in a manner, dependent on the will; for were there none 
other power in the soul but contemplation, says Dr. 
Hutcheson, there would be no affection, volition, desire, 
or action ; further, without some motion of will, no man 
would voluntarily persevere in contemplation, there must 
be a desire of knowledge and of the pleasure which at- 
tends it ; and this too is an act of willing. 

conclusive. * A man/' says Lccke, " whom I cannot deny, may oblige 
me to use persuasions to another which, at the same time I am speak- 
ing, I may wish may not prevail upon him. In this case," continues 
Locke, " 'tis plain the will and desire run counter. I will the action 
that tends one way, whilst my desire tends another, and that the direct 
contrary." The reason, I humbly conceive, is because a stronger con- 
quers the weaker desire. Again, " A man, who by a violent fit of the 
gout in his limbs, finds a doziness in his head, or a want of appetite in 
his stomach removed, desires to be eased too of the pain of his feet or 
hands, (for where there is pain there is desire to be ridden of it) thougli 
yet whilst he apprehends that the removal of the pain may translate the 
noxious humour to a more vital part, his will is never determined to any 
one action that may serve to remove the pain." What does this prove 
more than that the will is prudently restrained by the superior energies 
of the intellectual faculty ? 
* Lectures concerning Oratory; by John Lawson, D.D. page 156. 



".'2 ANTI-SCEPTICISM; OR, 

Taking this for granted. Dr. Lawson and the writers 
quoted by him, arc all partly wrong and all partly right. 
Passions are not springs of action different from the 
will, but they are the will, or feelings of the will, modi- 
fied by experience. 

Having been furnished with the elaborate treatises of 
Dr. Hutcheson, and the subsequent disquisitions of the 
learned Dublin Professor, Mr. Lawrence might have 
been convinced that the passions are not the result of 
material organization. And it is a matter of surprise 
that E. Burke, Blair, Ward, Herries, Sheridan, Walker, 
and other men of eminence, have not given more ample 
definitions of the passions, than as feelings or organs of 
the soul, modifications, affections, or instincts; so that 
appetites, affections, and passions, three distinct modifica- 
tions of feeling, are mingled and thrown confusedly to- 
gether. 

It is plain, from the definition of the passion of love 
in the Essay concerning Human Understanding, that 
the ideas of Locke on passion were imperfect ; " Thus," 
says the author, " any one reflecting upon the thought 
he has of the delight which any present or absent thing 
is apt to produce in him, has the idea we call love.* For 
when a man declares in autumn, when he is eating them, 
or in spring, when there are none, that he loves grapes, 
it is no more, but that the taste of grapes delights him ; 
let an alteration of health or constitution destroy the de- 
light of the taste, and he then can be said to love 
grapes no longer."f To disprove this description, which 

* That is, the passion of love ; for having next defined hatred, the 
writer observes, " were it my business here to inquire any farther than 
into the bare idea of passions " &c. 

t Locke's Essay, chap. 20. 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 33 

indeed is none other than of appetite, it may be merely 
noticed, that it is the union of affection with another 
modification of feeling, called appetite, which constitutes 
passion : so that if " alteration of health or constitution" 
produces an effect in the animal system, similar to the 
above illustration of Locke, it is possible for the affection 
of love still to remain, perfect. Does not the story of 
Eloisa and Abelard exemplify this ? or is there not in 
the world such a feeling of the mind as affection between 
the sexes ? " Love," says Dr. Smith, " is a violent, hot, 
and impetuous passion : esteem is a sedate, and cool, and 
peaceable affection of the mind." This is beautifully 
illustrated by a modern dramatist:* "Listen to me, 
child. I Would proffer you friendship, for your own 
sake — for the Sake of benevolence. When ages, indeed, 
are nearly equal, nature is prone to breathe so warmly 
on the blossoms of friendship between the sexes, that the 
fruit is desire ; but Time, fair one, is scattering snow on 
my temples, while Hebe waves her freshest ringlets over 
yours. Rely then on one who has encountered difficul- 
ties enough to teach him sympathy; and who would 
stretch forth his hand to a wandering female, and shelter 
her like a father." 

Appetite is peculiar to the animal, and discovers itself 
antecedently to any idea of good in the object, by un- 
easy sensation. This seems to be an admirable con- 
trivance of the Deity to counterbalance the absence of 
reason ; that animals, without it, may provide for their 
necessities, and regulate the ties, the nice dependencies 
Avhich bind them to their species. The affections of man 
may be said properly to belong to the soul: they are 

* Mr. George Colman, the younger. 



34 anti-scepticism; or, 

feelings oF calm desire or aversion, instituted by catena- 
tion or association of idea; or, in other language, esta- 
blished by affinity of mind or correspondence of spiritual 
substance. Now the passions are feelings which seem to 
be confused bodily and mental sensations, either of 
pleasure or of pain; they are feelings or springs of 
action which connect our rational or imaginary ideas of 
good or evil. — The outward attributes of the passions are 
visible in the face and other parts of the body. 

If we regard the structure of the human mind, as only 
capable of attending to one object or set of objects at a 
time, we shall immediately conceive, that, unless the 
organs of the body and faculties of the soul are adequately 
attuned, confusion of thought, idea, and expression,- will 
be the natural consequence. Further : when the mind 
is in action, any sudden impetus of congenial, pleasurable, 
or painful bodily motion, will so prolong or invigorate 
the existing affection, as frequently to distract and con- 
found still more the reasoning faculty, and so pervert 
altogether the moral sense. Thus the thief is deluded by 
the idea of gain and riches ; and this keeps him from 
considering or having any dread of the evil, which lies 
sheltered under the false notion of gain ; of the desire that 
degrades his soul, and taints it with injustice. And then, 
as for any apprehension of discovery, imprisonment, and 
punishment, which are the only calamities dreaded by 
men of this description, his excessive eagerness utterly 
overlooks and stifles all these; for he presently repre- 
sents to himself what a world of men do such things, and 
yet are never found out.* On the other hand, when the 
passions are animated by the moral sense, they serve as 
so many springs to virtuous actions. 

* Sulpicius's Commentary upon Epictetus, chap. 2; 



AN INQUIRY, &C. - 35 

The passions, as well as the affections,* therefore, are 
feelings, or secret springs of action, modified by associa- 
tion of idea. The affections are wholly intellectual ; the 
passions are partly intellectual and partly corporeal. 
Hence the passions are the mental and corporeal effects 
of certain peculiar sensations which have been impressed 
on the mind by various mechanical stimuli. When the 
mind is anxious of possessing objects which are expected 
to yield agreeable impressions, such anticipations are 
called hope. The actual possession of the objects desired 
Is called joy. — The ideas or reflexions of such objects 
between the sexes excite the -passion of love.— 

" Good shepherd, tell this youth what 'tis to love !" 

" It is to be all made of phantasy : 

All made of passion and all made of wishes : 

All adoration, duty, and obedience : 

All humbleness, all patience, and impatience : 

All purity, all trial, all observance." f 

"As soon as a heart, before hard and obdurate, is 
softened in this flame, we shall observe arising along with 
it," says Dr. Hutcheson, " a love of poetry, music, the 
beauty of nature in rural scenes, a contempt of the selfish 
pleasures of the external senses, a neat dress, a bene- 
volent deportment, a delight in, and emulation of every 
thing which is gallant, generous, and friendly." 

The probability of enduring sensations which have 
before caused disagreeable impressions, excites the passion 
of fear : the suffering of them, grief: the ideas of the 
objects, hatred. 

* " The internal affections necessarily arise according to our opinion 
of their objects."— "An Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil" page 
288.— Hutcheson. 

t Shakspeare's Winter's Tale. 

D 2 



3$ anti-scepticism; or, 

According to these definitions and illustrations, the 
passions correspond with various ideas which men have 
of rational desire or aversion ; and, as before mentioned, 
they are accompanied by confused bodily sensations : and 
the external attributes of them are visible in the face and 
various parts of the body: — so that the impressions of 
good or pleasurable objects excite love ,• and those of evil 
or painful objects excite hatred : — and they are variously 
modified in proportion to the degree of the certainty or 
uncertainty of the presence or absence of the good or 
evil. The passions, consequently, arise from a sense of 
right and wrong.* 

This compendium corresponds with the account of 
Dr. Hutcheson ; which the following short extract will 
prove : — 

" We may easily conceive our affections and passions," 
says Hutcheson, " in this manner. The apprehension 
of good, either to ourselves or others, as attainable, raises 
desire j the like apprehension of evil, or of the loss of 
goody raises aversion, or desire of removing or prevent- 
ing it. These two are the proper affections, distinct 
from all sensation : we may call both desires if we please. 
The reflection upon the presence or certain futurity of 
any good, raises the sensation of joy, which is distinct 
from those immediate sensations which arise from the 
object itself. A like sensation is raised, when we reflect 
upon the removal or prevention of evil which once 
threatened ourselves or others. The reflection upon the 
presence of evil, or the certain prospect of it, or of the 
loss of good, is the occasion of the sensation of sorrow, 

* Dramatic and epic poetry are entirely addressed to this sense, and 
raise our passions by the fortunes of characters, distinctly represented 
as naturally good or eril. — Hutcheson. 



AN INQUIRY, &C "37 

distinct from the immediate sensations arising from the 
objects or events themselves. These affections, viz, de- 
sire, aversion, joy, and sorrow, we may, after Mal- 
branche," continues Hutcheson, " call spiritual ox pure 
affections ; because the purest spirit, were it subject to 
any evil, might be capable of them. But beside these 
affections, which seem to arise necessarily from a rational 
apprehension of good or evil, there are in our nature 
violent confused sensations, connected with bodily motions, 
from which our affections are denominated passions"* 



CHAP. VL 

Locke's notion of matter and substance — controversy between Locke 
and the Bishop of Worcester — the inference of Locke shewn to be 
the highest probability and opinion ; that of the Bishop of Worcester, 
the demonstration and certainty, that " the thinking thing in us is im- 
material" — argument of modern chemists confuted — the commence- 
ment of the study of philosophy and true theoretic science aided by 
the light of Revelation. 

J.F there is any truth in these remarks, it is plain, that 
the notion of Locke respecting passion began and ended 
in the " instrumentality of the outward organs." But it 
is presumed, that this should be merely viewed as an 
oversight; it ought not to be received as a reason for 
concluding, that the author of " The Essay on Human 
Understanding" would have agreed with M. Bichat in 
his conception respecting the "passion of a cabbage /" 
and for this evident reason; because the arguments of 
Locke respecting the passions, do not, by any means, 
correspond with those which he himself has brought for- 

* The Nature and Conduct of the Passions, pages 62 and 6$.—Hutchest>n. 



38 anti-scepticism; or, 

ward concerning matter and spiritual substance. But 
the arguments of Locke on these subjects have been 
strangely misunderstood. It very commonly happens, 
that those who have read detached passages only of one 
side of a controversy, are the very persons who arrogate 
to themselves the power and right of deciding upon the 
merits of all that has been said and written upon it. 
Thus, from a hasty perusal of one or two detached sen- 
tences, to be selected from the celebrated controversy of 
Locke and the Bishop of Worcester, the name even of 
the great and enlightened author of " The Essay on 
Human Understanding" has been impugned. But those 
who, in any tolerable degree, are acquainted with this 
controversy, will perceive, that when the author of the 
" Remarks on Scepticism," says that matter is incapable of 
thought, he is supported in the most unqualified manner 
by Locke. " If we suppose nothing to be first, matter 
can never begin to be ; if we suppose bare matter with- 
out motion to be eternal, motion can never begin to be: 
if matter and motion be supposed eternal, thought can 
never begin to be ; for if matter could produce thought, 
then thought must be in the power of matter ; and if it 
be in matter as such, it must be the inseparable property 
of all matter ; which is contrary to the sense and expe- 
rience of mankind." This is the substance of the argu- 
ment used by Locke, to prove an infinite spiritual being : 
and was agreeable to the opinions of his antagonist, the 
Bishop of Worcester ; who cited the passage to shew 
that he was " far from weakening the force of it." And 
yet there are some men, such individuals as have been 
mentioned, or individuals but a few gradations removed 
from them, and most undoubtedly of sceptical opinions, 
who maintain that a sedulous perusal of the writings of 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 39 

Locke would tend to make the reader a materialist. 
The remarks of these persons are most artfully intro- 
duced to the minds of the young, with a mention of 
the well-known conclusion of Locke, that " all the great 
ends of morality and religion are well enough secured 
without a demonstration that the thinking thing in us is 
immaterial." The meaning of this sentence is no sooner 
received by artless and unwary young men, than their 
preceptor quotes a detached sentence from the " Essay 
on Human Understanding," to shew " that we have the 
ideas of matter and thinking, but possibly shall never be 
able to know whether any material being thinks or not ; 
it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our 
own ideas, without revelation, to discover whether om- 
nipotency hath not given to some systems of matter, fitly 
disposed, a power to perceive or think." The sceptic 
(no doubt very charitably) assists his pupil to interpret 
the passage in perverting the language and argument of 
the antagonist of Locke to his own purpose. -" If this 
be true then, for all that we can know by our ideas of 
matter and thinkings matter may have a power of think- 
ing ; and if this hold, then it is impossible to prove a 
spiritual substance in us, from the idea of thinking ; for 
how can we be assured by our ideas, that God hath not 
given such a power of thinking, to matter so disposed as 
our bodies are? Especially since it is said, 'that in 
respect of our notions, it is not much more remote from 
our comprehension to conceive that God can, if he 
pleases, superadd to our idea of matter a faculty of 
thinking.' " It is then answered, " whoever asserts this 
can never prove a spiritual substance in us from a faculty 
of thinking ; because he cannot know from the idea of 
matter and thinking, that matter so disposed cannot 



40 anti-scepticism; OR, 

think. And he cannot be certain, that God hath not 
framed the matter of our bodies so as to be capable of 
it." If this conclusion from the passage in the Essay on 
Human Understanding were just, it would then follow 
that the opinions of Locke were correspondent with those 
contained in the French philosophy. It is presumed 
that the true state of the case is otherwise. In the pas- 
sage alluded to, Locke meant no more than that "A 
thinking substance may be combined with a stone, a tree, 
or an animal body ; but that not one of the three can of 
itself become a thinking being :" and " what is true of 
one material substance, is true of every other ; for all 
matter, whether organic or inorganic, fluid or solid, is 
endowed with the same essential properties." * But let 
the immortal Locke speak for himself. " Your Lord- 
ship argues, that upon my principles it cannot be proved 
that there is a spiritual substance in us. To which give 
me leave, with submission, to say, that I think it may be 
proved from my principles, and I think I have done it ; 
and the proof in my book stands thus. First, we expe- 
riment in ourselves thinking. The idea of this action or 
mode of thinking, is inconsistent with the idea of self 
subsistence, and therefore has a necessary connexion 
with a support or subject of inhesion : the idea of that 
support is what we call substance ; and so from thinking 
experimented in us, we have a proof of a thinking sub- 
stance in us, which in my sense is a spirit. Against this 
your Lordship will argue, that by what I have said of 
the possibility that God may, if he pleases, superadd to 
matter a faculty of thinking, it can never be proved that 
there is a spiritual substance in us, because upon that 

• Remarks on Scepticism, page 89. 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 41 

supposition it is possible it may be a material substance 
that thinks in us. I grant it ; but add, that the general 
idea of substance being the same every where, the modi- 
fication of thinking, or the power of thinking joined to 
it, makes it a spirit, without considering what other mo- 
dification it has, as, whether it has the modification of 
solidity or no. As on the other side substance, that has 
the modification of solidity is matter, whether it has the 
modification of thinking or no. And, therefore, if your 
Lordship means by a spiritual, an immaterial substance, 
I grant I have not proved, nor, upon my principles, can 
it be proved, your Lordship meaning (as I think you do) 
demonstratively proved, that there is an immaterial sub- 
stance in us that thinks. Though I presume, from what 
I have said about the supposition of a system of matter, 
thinking (which there demonstrates that God is imma- 
terial) will prove it in the highest degree probable, that 
the thinking substance in us is immaterial. But your 
Lordship thinks probability not enough, and by charg- 
ing the want of demonstration upon my principles, that 
the thinking thing in us is immaterial, your Lordship 
seems to conclude it demonstrable from principles of 
philosophy." 

This elucidation of the passage is exceedingly satis- 
factory : the inference of the arguments of Locke, being 
the highest probability and opinion that the thinking 
thing in us is immaterial, and the inference of the argu- 
ments of the Bishop of Worcester being the demonstra- 
tion and certainty that the thinking thing in us is imma- 
terial. The fact is, the philosophy of Locke, like that 
of Bacon, having " God for its author," was derived 
from the pure fountain of truth. " Bor this corruptible 
must put on incorruption, and this mortal must' put on im- 



4J anti-scepticism; or, 

mortality ;" so that what Locke said, " To shew that all 
the great ends of religion and morality are secured barely 
by the immortality of the soul, without a necessary sup- 
position that the soul is immaterial," he maintained 
" that immortality may and shall be annexed to that 
which in its own nature is neither immaterial nor im- 
mortal, as the Apostle has expressly declared." After 
having quoted from the Tusculan Questions and the sixth 
book of the iEneid, he proves that Cicero and Virgil 
put the same distinction between body and spirit as the 
writers of the Old and New Testaments had done. 
" That the one was a gross compages that could be felt 
and handled; and that the other, such as Virgil describes 
the ghost and soul of Anchises to be." The following 
elucidates the fact : " Behold my hands and my feet L , that 
it is I myself: handle me and see ; for a spirit hath not 
flesh and bones, as ye see me have. 1 * These arguments 
respecting the true meaning of the passage which has 
been here cited, Locke concludes with the following 
affirmation of his doctrine ; which, I conceive, few per- 
sons will be hardy or bold enough to attempt to contro- 
vert. " Upon my principles," says Locke, " i. e. from 
the idea of thinking, we can have a ceiiainty that there 
is a thinking substance in us; from hence we have a 
certainty that there is an eternal thinking substance. This 
thinking substance, which has been from eternity, I have 
proved to be immaterial. This eternal, immaterial, 
thinking substance, hath put into us a thinking sub- 
stance, which, whether it be a material or immaterial 
substance, cannot be infallibly demonstrated from our 
ideas ; though from them it may be proved, that it is to 

the HIGHEST DEGREE PROBABLE THAT IT IS IMMATERIAL. 

This, in short, my Lord, is what I have to say on this 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 43 

point." Still modern chemists maintain that nothing 
but matter can act upon matter ; therefore the soul, say 
they, is material. But Locke has proved, that there is 
an eternal, immaterial, thinking substance; now this 
eternal, immaterial, thinking substance creates, supports, 
and governs all things, material and immaterial: upon 
this we conclude that an immaterial substance can act 
upon a material substance. Thus the argument of mo- 
dern chemists respecting materialism, is at one blow 
annihilated. We need not hesitate then in affirming 
with Mr. Rennell, that " Notwithstanding all the at- 
tempts which have been made to dissolve the connexion, 
Revelation and science will ever receive a mutual coun- 
tenance and support from each other. All the labours 
of philosophic research have illustrated the page of 
Revelation, and Revelation itself has added strength and 
solidity to the discoveries of science."* Impressed with 
these ideas, and not till then, man exerts his intellectual 
powers to advantage — here his study of philosophy and 
true theoretic science properly begins: it is here that 
the lover of wisdom inhales the purest vital air ; it is in 
the regions of unsophisticated truth, that students in 
every department of scientific research employ their 
energies to the best possible advantage for themselves 
and their fellow men. 

* Remarks on Scepticism, page 131. 



11 anti-scepticism; or, 



CHAP. VII. 

Opinion that if Home Tooke had pursued the same course of reasoning 
as Locke had done, respecting fundamental doctrines, he would then 
have been able to answer his own query respecting the substantive 
and the verb — application of the two preceding chapters to the ques- 
tion of Home Tooke — none else than the first cause can say I have 
existence in or with my essence — inference and exemplification of 
the nature of the artificial verb and definition — elucidation of five 
elementary parts of speech and the use of the article and other re- 
strictives — the use of supernumerary particles when reasoning on the 
simple proposition. 

IT is evident, to me at least, that if Home Tooke had 
availed himself of the course of reasoning which had 
been adopted by Locke, respecting intellect and Revela- 
tion, and had he imbibed more accurate notions than it 
is manifest he did, respecting the eternal, immutable, and 
necessary existence, he would then, possibly, have been 
enabled to separate the verb from the substantive, in the 
artificial language of man : he would have seen the fallacy 
of supposing the existence of " a differential something" 
in the verb over and above what he conceived to be in- 
herent in the substantive. The truth is, every step 
which man takes in science, should be done with exceed- 
ing humility : by night and by day he should feel himself 
dependent on the Being who called him into birth; on the 
Being who supports and incites him forward to action. 
And, let it be asked, what mighty stretch of thought 
does this require ? Quod si et ilia cognoscit Deus, quidni 
et curet P — is the language of the learned and philosophic 
Grotius, on the individual government and providence 
of God. But it is of little consequence to science, that 
we assent to the truth of any just and incontrovertible 



AN INQUIRY, &C 4S 

proposition, unless " by industry and patient thought," * 
we apply it, and suffer it to influence our judgment in 
its decisions respecting apparently contrary circum- 
stances. This remark is altogether applicable to science 
in general, and also to the one grand and fundamental 
proposition — there is an infinitely wise and perfect Being, 
who creates, supports, and governs all things. Units 
est vivus 9 et verus Deus, ceternus, incorporeus, impar- 
tibilis, impassibilis, immensce potentice, sapienti<£, ac bo- 
?iitatis, creato?- et conservato?- omnium, turn visibilium, 
turn invisibilium. " Most important it is," says an elo- 
quent writer, whom I have frequently quoted, " that in 
every department of philosophy, the mind should be led 
upward to discern the intimate connexion and absolute 
dependence of all things upon God : that their beginning 
should be traced to the causation of his power, and their 
end to the fulfilment of his will. It was this w 7 hich 
added to the researches of Newton, of Bacon, and of 
Locke, an elevation, a clearness, and a consistency, to 
which, otherwise, even with the powers of their mighty 
minds, they could never have attained. They drank 
deep of the fountain of all truth : they began and they 
ended in God."f 

Applying these remarks to the present purpose, recol- 
lecting the truth and fundamental article of belief in our 
inquiries concerning the nature and philosophy of lan- 
guage, we shall be soon led to an acknowledgment of 

* " When I wrote my Treatise about our system," says Sir Isaac 
Newton, in his letter to Dr. Bentley, " I had an eye upon such prin- 
ciples as might work with considerate men for the belief of a Deity ; 
and nothing can rejoice me more, than to find it useful for that purpose. 
But if I have done the public any service in this way, it is due to no- 
thing but industry and patient thought" 

i Remarks on Scepticism, page 9, 



46 anti-scepticism; or, 

the correspondent natures of the substantive, the verb, 
and its attribute. In this exalted sense the verb is 
coeval with the noun substantive. Hoc inde colligitur, 
quod Deus, ut supra jam dictum est, est id, quod est neces- 
sario, sive per se : but this does not apply to artificial 
language; because none else than this eternal, immuta- 
ble, and necessary existence can say I AM. That is, I 
have existence in or with my essence. 'Eyu Eip* It fol- 
lows, therefore, that every created being, mind, and 
body, and every sort of matter and motion is an accusa- 
tive case, governed by some verb corresponding to the 
notion which we attach to the word cause or create: 
which verb, in its exalted signification, is coeval with the 
substantive, both being concentrated in the one word, or 
Aoyoq — verbum essentiale Dei, sive Christus (Hederico) 
Dei verbum, imo magis ipse Deus {Iren : p. 132, Water- 
landi) — this Aoyog, therefore, is the 'Eyv El^r. Before 
Abraham was, I AM. 

It is necessarily understood, reasonably and philoso- 
phically inferred, that, in artificial language, though the 
verb to be is neuter, yet, in relation to the first Cause of 
all created being and matter, it is active. Thus: S w* s 
the Being (including under the term the notion of power 
and might irresistible, perfect knowledge and consum- 
mate wisdom, eternity, immutability, and omnipresence, 
creative power, supremacy, independence, and necessary 
existence) bes (facit ut sit : i. e. creates or causes to exist) 
being (i. e. spiritual and corporeal substance, mind and 
body — man — and matter and motion.) The Being bes 
being : that is, the almighty and everlasting God creates 
matter and motion, mind and body, and all other spirits 
and substances : the Almighty creates man. Creates is the 
verb to be in disguise. To comprehend the full meaning 



AN INQUIRY, &C 47 

of what is here advanced, let us make man the subject- of 
the verb, and some other word the predicate : we shall 
perceive then, that the verb no longer maintains its 
active power, but becomes neuter. " Man is an animal." 
Here the part of speech is, evidently has neither the 
force of creates, nor indeed that of exists ; for it is not 
meant, that man exists, he being an animal, i. e. because 
he is an animal : nor is it merely meant that man exists, 
an animal exists. The meaning and force of the verb, 
is, in this instance, indicates it to be a sign of affirmation, 
to shew that man is not merely a name, nomen, but that 
it is a noun substantive, nomen substantivum, and that 
something is predicated of man. In pronouncing the 
sentence, " Man is an animal," is assumes no more im- 
portance than a particle, for it has no , accent, but is 
joined to the two parts of speech, an animal — the three 
being pronounced as one word} viz. is-ananimal, with 
the accent on the antepenultimate syllable. In Greek 
and Latin, the verb to be, used in this sense, is frequently 
omitted; and in Hebrew it is almost always used ex- 
clusively as referring to the Elohim. The Causing 
Power, or First Cause, causes the second causing power, 
or motion s i. e. the Almighty causes motion. Now it is 
plain, that if the order of the substantives were trans- 
posed, the meaning then conveyed would be that of a 
false proposition ; — affirming the doctrine of atheistical 
philosophy : but, if we say, motion [or secondary cause) 
causes health ; or, in other words, exercise (or secondary 
cause) strengthens the constitution: this is a true proposition. 
Hence it is perceived, that parts of speech indicative of 
causes are subjects or nominative cases of verbs, and that 
the verb, in its original and most enlarged sense, is used 
to signify the being or statg, the modification of the state 



4S anti-scepticism; or, 

and force of a cause or an agent and an object. This 
simple process explains the nature and construction of 
artificial language; it is presumed, moreover, that this 
process discovers, that " the verb is" — not — w something 
more than the substantive ;" but that it is a differential 
sign or part of speech, used to point out the power which 
one substantive has over another substantive: or, in 
other words, a verb is a part of speech, which signifies 
that a thing exists, that it is something more than a 
mere name, that the thing lives, that it is a noun substan- 
tive : the verb indicates, likewise, that something is 
affirmed of the noun substantive; it points out that a 
noun substantive acts upon an object or suffers by an 
agent. A verb, therefore, is apart of speech >whicfy is used 
in discourse to signify the modification of the state, life, 
and power, of a noun substantive. 

From these, and some former arguments, it is proved, 
that the verb arose from the noun substantive ; and that 
the verb is a sign or part of speech to signify the state of 
the noun substantive. It has been also shewn, that, in 
communicating primary sensations, we adopt five ele- 
mentary parts of speech : this adoption, it has appeared, is 
applicable to all languages, and upon this the first princi- 
ples of Grammar are uniformly founded. But these ele- 
mentary parts of speech require restrictives, pointers, or 
markers, before they can stand for definitive and gram- 
matical sentences : which the following elucidations will 
clearly demonstrate : — 

Harsh sound offends greatly ear. 
In this order of words, the subject or cause of the im- 
pression, " harsh sound," is conveyed to the mind 
through the medium of the appropriate organ, and, in 
communicating to another the effect occasioned, it is 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 49 

instantly hurried back with types or figures of voice ex- 
pressive of the whole sensation : still " harsh sound" is a 
general term ; therefore, to render the meaning of the 
term distinct and particular, a restrictive part of speech 
is required. 

Red ball strikes gently green ball. 
In this, as in the former order of words, the subject or 
cause of the impression being first announced, the action, 
" strikes," or first part of the effect occasioned, follows ; 
next the manner of the action, " gently," and lastly, the 
object or accusative of the verb. And here, as before, 
is clearly required the restrictive part of speech. The 
same remark will apply to the following examples : — 
Delicious peach diffuses powerfully flavour. 
Hard ball strikes forcibly hand. 
Damask rose scatters agreeably odour. 
Every word in these examples is introduced, and 
placed one after the other in its natural order : and 
however, in languages of the transpositive idiom, such 
order may be broken, yet according to the clear con- 
struction of the English language, the situation of no 
one of them, in the whole five examples, could be altered, 
without materially injuring the picture of each sensation. 
But, as it has been said, the meaning which is attached 
to each sentence is general ; the use of articles and pro- 
nouns, therefore, is essential to clearness and perspicuity. 
The distinct use and restrictive power of the article is 
well explained by Dr. Blair: — " When men had got 
beyond simple interjections or exclamations of passion," 
says this elegant writer, " and had begun to commu- 
nicate their ideas to each other, they would be obliged 
to assign names to the objects by which they were sur- 
rounded. Whichever way he locked, forests and trees 

K 



.50 ANTI-&CEPTICISM ; OR, 

■would meet the eye of the beholder. To distinguish 
the trees by separate names would have been endless. 
Their common qualities, such as springing from a root, 
and bearing branches and leaves would suggest a general 
idea and a general name. The genus, a tree, would 
afterwards be subdivided into its several species of oak, 
elm, ash, &c. by experience and observation." 

" Still, however, only general terms of speech were 
adopted. For the oak, the elm, and the ash, were names 
of whole classes of objects, each of which comprehended 
an immense number of undistinguished individuals. Thus 
when the terms, man, lion, or tree, were mentioned in 
conversation, it would not be known which man, lion, 
or tree was meant, among the multitude comprehended 
under one name. Hence arose a very useful and curious 
contrivance for determining the individual object in- 
tended, by means of that part of speech called the 
article." 

' Although it is not immediately connected with our 
present purpose, to enter into the discussion of topics 
blended with etymology, yet I shall not withhold one or 
two remarks respecting the article and the pronominal 
adjective or demonstrative pronoun : and the more espe- 
cially, as it will corroborate the general argument of the 
noun substantive's being the primitive part of speech. 

An is evidently derived from ane or ccnc, the Saxoi% 
for one. Of all the anomalies in English pronunciation, 
the part of speech one, pronounced ooun, is nearly the 
greatest: but whether or not we regard the Saxon pro- 
nunciation of dene, an, as the root of the article an, it is 
very clear, that we can derive this part of speech even 
from the corrupted ooun. Thus in vulgar phraseology, 
" a man is a good 'un or a bad 'un : his action is a good 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 51 

•im or a bad 'un :" here un is most certainly a contraction 
of ooun. The possessives mine and thine, and also the 
vulgar hern and theirn, are unquestionably to be derived 
from the same source — u being afterwards syncopated. 
And though the a in an may have descended to us 
through the obsolete ane, (used in North Britain for 
one), still the pronunciation of an is as truly the identical 
articulation of the contracted un, as heard in each of the 
above phrases. Thus, we say un apple, pronounced as 
one word, viz. unapple, or un egg, unegg, and not an 
apple, nor an egg, though it is so written. 

Accounting for the article an, and, at the same time, 
proving, that it was originally either a noun or an ad- 
jective, we can account for the article a, independently 
of the Saxon, upon the same principle as that which 
governs, in composition, the alteration or elision of the 
consonants in the Latin ad, ab, con, and in. Thus n 
before m became altered in the pronunciation to m ; be- 
fore b, to b ; and so of the rest of the consonants : or 
rather the n in the article an before a consonant was 
identified with the consonant. Thus : instead of saying 
am man, ab ball, &c. that is, articulating the consonant 
twice, our ancestors adopted, possibly, the articulation 
of the Latins in their pronunciation of such words as 
immitto ; here, though m and t are written twice, each 
letter is articulated but once. The same remarks apply 
to such English words as committee ; the consonants m 
and t are only articulated once ; i. e. in articulating the 
letter m, the lips unite once only, and, in articulating t> 
the tongue connects itself once only with the gums. It 
is presumed that the root of a and an is clearly seen in the 
numeral one ; and this enables us to trace a and an to a 
noun or an adjective. They are called articles indefinite, 

e 2 



anti-scepticism; or, 

because they point out the general signification of the 
substantive to which they are annexed. The article an 
is used before vowels, and before words beginning with 
h mute ; the article a before consonants, and before the 
part of speech one, the letter u, when open, as in the 
words use, union, university, and before the aspirate //, 
unless the accent of the word be on the second syllable, 
as an heroic action, an historical account. 

Our article the points out and determines how far the 
signification of the noun or substantive to which it is an- 
nexed extends, and is, therefore, called definite. This 
article closely resembles the demonstrative pronoun that : 
the principal differences in these two parts of speech ap- 
pear to be these : the pronoun that has usually an accent, 
the article the has not: that, therefore, may be used 
without a noun or substantive, the cannot. Home 
Tooke considers that as the past participle, and the as 
the imperative mood of the verb thean, to get, to take, 
to assume : but independently of etymological analysis, 
the and that may be reduced to adjectives by opposing 
them to a. " I said the hard ball, not a hard ball ; I said 
that red ball, not a red ball." 

In the use of the article, the English is superior to the 
Roman language : which is exemplified in the following 
instances. " The friend of a king — the friend of the 
king — a friend of the king." Each of these phrases, 
says Dr. Blair, has a separate meaning, too obvious to 
be misunderstood. In Latin, amicus regis, is entirely 
undetermined : it may bear any of the three senses which 
have been mentioned : and requires other words to 
ascertain its meaning.* The Greek, o, £, to, corresponds 

* Dr. Blair's Lectures* 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 53 

with our definite article; the absence of it in Greek, 
signifies, that a noun or substantive is to be of general 
application. In this* respect, the English is superior to 
the Greek ; but the Greek article, as a prefix to the 
infinitive mood, as a sign to signify its noun-state, is a 
refinement, which does not occur in our language. 

The former five examples of primary sensations may 
now be altered and restricted thus : 

That harsh sound offends greatly the ear. 
" The ear :" in this instance, the article has peculiarly a 
restrictive power ; it means, I conceive, the or every ear 
which is perfectly susceptible ; or it may mean the ear of 
the person speaking. 

The red ball strikes gently the green ball. 

This delicious peach diffuses powerfully the flavour. 

The hard ball strikes forcibly the hand. 

This damask rose scatters agreeably the odour. 

Words are the transcripts of ideas : the more strictly 
these transcriptions adhere to the analogy of thought, 
the more adequately will the growth of idea be repre- 
sented. But as the mind, that grand and noble spring 
of action, is capable of considerable advancement, she is 
desirous, through the medium of her powers over the 
body and its organs, to exercise her god-like functions 
of reason ; she is not satisfied with the mere impressive 
sensation of single objects, with the mere utterance of 
individual propositions ; but, by a certain consciousness 
of sensation in her faculty, she is desirous of extending 
them to the use and comfort of her outward frame ; and 
by affording balmy consolations of future emancipation, 
she suggests the necessity of a dignified deportment. 

When we proceed to reason on the simple proposition, 
the analogous order of words is in some measure broken; 



54? ANTI-SCEPTICISM ; OR, 

and supernumerary particles of speech are then adopted, 
to connect and unite words into another form of phrase- 
ology ; in which, not only all the operations of the art 
of reasoning are brought into action ; but, likewise, all 
the flowers and ornaments of mild and soft persuasion 
are employed, to delight and amuse the imagination. 
Though the meaning be complex, the unity of the sen- 
tence must be perfect. A simple or known object (after 
the sensation of it has been made upon the mind through 
the medium of the appropriate outward organ) has, for 
expression or communication, its one type or single 
figure in written characters, called a word : but a com- 
plex, strange, or undefined object, has its many types, 
figures, or words, drawn by the mind from likeness, from 
comparison, and example. 

" As in the works of nature, no man can properly 
call a river deep, or a mountain high, without the know- 
ledge of many mountains and many rivers ; so in the 
productions of genius, nothing can be styled excellent, 
till it has been compared with other works of the same 
kind." 

In communicating this form of idea, the English lan- 
guage is furnished with smaller particles of speech, which 
stand for relatives, auxiliaries, connectives, conjunctives, 
and disjunctives, with definers or markers; these are 
gathered about the nouns, the verbs, and their attributes, 
to render them analogous to the perception, and easy 
and familiar to the understanding. It appears to be the 
general opinion, that almost all the derivations of Home 
Tooke are established : with the following affirmation of 
his theory respecting pronouns, conjunctions, and prepo- 
sitions, I shall pass over the subject of etymology, re- 
commending to those who are partial to philological study, 



AN INQUIRY, &C, 55 

and have not hitherto read the work, a careful perusal 
of the " Diversions of Purley." " All those words which 
are usually termed pronouns, conjunctions, and prepo- 
sitions, are the corruptions of nouns or verbs, and are 
still employed with a sense referrible to that which they 
bore when in the acknowledged form of nouns and 
verbs." To this I shall merely add, that although pro- 
nouns are generally used to avoid the repetition of nouns, 
they sometimes stand as nouns, i. e. not to avoid the 
repetition of nouns : and, in this case, they have a pecu- 
liar restrictive power : for example — " He who cannot 
persuade himself," &c. he is accentuated, and has the 
force of a noun preceded by a definite article, i. e. the 
man who cannot, &c. 

To render the communication of an idea easy and 
familiar to the understanding, words must be properly 
chosen ; and words distributed in suitable order are 
essential to the beauty and elegance of compound sen- 
tences. This seems to be deduced from a general 
principle of nature; the eye and the ear are fond of 
uniting such objects and sounds, as shall bear the 
closest resemblance to each other, and also of placing 
others at a measured distance, that comparison may be 
formed, and the value of contradistinction and variety 
be duly appreciated. Notwithstanding this, our collo- 
quial sentences do not always exemplify this order ; and 
yet we are understood. To account for this circum- 
stance belongs to the topics connected with the Theory 
of Elocution,* and is perfectly foreign to the object of 4 
the present Treatise, 

* Vide the Philosophy of Elocution, page 121 $— the circumstance is 
there explained. 



56 ANTI-SCfePTlCi&M ; OK, 



CHAP. VIII. 

Question, whether or not the English grammar should be formed oil 
the Latin plan — opinions of grammarians respecting the six cases — 
objections answered — the authors of the Eton Latin Grammar ha\e 
proceeded upon the supposition that the Latin can be taught in con- 
nexion an ith the English grammar — Latin neuter nouns, &c. — eluci- 
dations Of the English genitive — accentuation and the union of the 
parts of speech which stand for the English of Latin nouns — Latin 
prepositions — tenses of the verb. 

IT may be safely affirmed, that the best writers of 
English, are those scholars who have derived their know- 
ledge of grammar from a study of the dead languages.* 
In our public schools, and, excepting a very few in- 
stances, in our private classical schools, the English 
grammar is not taught. The pupils of each seminary 
become gradually acquainted with grammar and the 
use of their native tongue, from the study of Greek and 
Latin, and the reading of the best classical English 
authors. This, however, has not prevented grammarians 
of talent and celebrity from arranging institutes for the 
exclusive use of English students; and their motive, every 
one must allow, is honourable to their feelings, as English- 
men. Nevertheless, we cannot help regretting, that those 
institutes are not adapted, as much as the genius of our 
language will admit, to the government and discipline of 
the Latin tongue. It may be said, that, to a very great 
extent, the thing is impossible ; because the idioms of the 

r * " The habit of strict and careful analysis, which is formed by the 
process of judicious instruction in the Greek and Latin languages, is 
itself a most valuable acquisition, and is an excellent preparative for 
the exertion of the mental powers, in all other inquiries." * * * * "A 
correct English style and true delicacy of composition, are hardly ever 
acquired but by the medium of classical literature/' — Systematic Edu- 



an Inquiry, &c. 57 

two language?;, the order of words* and the general con- 
struction of sentences, are essentially different. Thai 
the languages do not correspond in idiom, every one 
will allow ; but that the leading principles of the gram- 
mar of English are different from those of Greek and 
Latin, is a proposition not so easily to be admitted. 
But if the idiomatic construction is different, it does not 
thence follow, that either the difference should be made 
to appear greater than it really is, or that where there is 
an actual resemblance, it should be concealed. To the 
youthful mind, the path towards grammatical accuracy 
is sufficiently thorny, without rendering it more so. 
Besides, grammatical analysis, grounded upon the true 
philosophy of language, is the easiest and best possible 
mode of teaching the youthful mind to think ; the re- 
verse is certain to act as an impediment to the intellect 
tual advancement of those tyros, who, having mastered 
the principles of any of the English grammars now in 
use, might have occasion afterwards to apply themselves 
to the study of Latin and Greek. To one of Dryden's 
children, " a child of larger growth," a hobbedy-hoy, or 
a man, who might undertake the study of those lan- 
guages at an advanced age, the inconvenience would not 
be so considerable : because the meditative faculties and 
judgment in him would be alive; and the adult mind is 
capable of appreciating the merits of philosophical ana- 
lysis. But to little boys, who, by dint of application, 
have accomplished, and who pretty well understand the 
analytical parsing of Dr. Ash, Dr. Lowth, or Mr. 

* In English, it is the order of words which frequently distin- 
guishes the grammar of a sentence : viz. " Alexander conquered Da- 
rius :" invert the order of the nouns and the grammar of the sentence is 
changed. 



5S anti-scepticism; or, 

Lindley Murray, it is a serious labour and certainly a 
great loss of time ; because they are now under the ne- 
cessity of traversing the ground again, and that upon a 
more difficult and complicated plan. 

An English grammar, modelled upon the Latin form, 
would strengthen the conceptions of those pupils, who 
are intended to begin the study of the classics at their 
first entrance in the grammar school ; and what refers 
to these pupils would apply equally to those who might 
commence their classical studies at a future period. It 
may be here remarked, that, as there is very little varia- 
tion of the declensions of nouns and verbs in English, a 
grammar arranged upon the Latin plan would, of course, 
be much more easy of comprehension for the very little 
boy than the Latin grammar itself; where the declen- 
sions are of a more complex form. This plan would, I am 
convinced, be a wholesome preparative to the reading 
of the Eton, Westminster, or any other Latin grammar. 
The following remarks of Walker prove that, in this par- 
ticular, 1 am not singular in my opinions : — " Almost all 
our grammars," says this writer, " seem to lean, without 
necessity, to an exclusion of Latin terms, and Latin forms 
of construction. This propensity has been observed by 
a judicious grammarian, who says — 6 Most of the writers 
since Dr. Lowth, forming a supposition, perhaps, that 
the English language hath little concern with the Latin, 
seem to have departed as much as possible, not only from 
the rudiments, but the terms made use of in grammars 
of that tongue; and have chosen to put their materials 
into any form, rather than suffer them to fall in with the 
Latin plan. In the distribution of the moods and tenses 
particularly, there is a remarkable variety ; some arrange 
them in one manner, some in another; some enlarge, while 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 59 

others diminish their number. In one grammar a tense 
is transposed in the same mood ; in another, it is trans- 
planted into a different one ; and in all, many of the 
technical terms are changed for others, equally, if not 
more abstracted and perplexing : and thus a new kind 
of grammatical language has been invented.' — Shaw's 
Grammar ; Preface. — " From this state of the case, 
which appears to be a very just one," continues Walker, 
u we may perceive how difficult it is to avoid extremes. 
Because some of the old grammarians were too fond of 
the Latin terms, and Latin forms of construction, the 
moderns have attempted to exclude them altogether; 
and thus, by avoiding one fault, have fallen into an- 
other. 

" But it will be naturally demanded, of what use to 
an English scholar is retaining the Latin terms and 
forms of construction? It may be answered, that if 
these terms and forms of construction are as intelligible 
as any we can substitute in their stead, why should we 
depart from the ancient and received grammatical lan- 
guage of Europe, without deriving any advantage from 
the change ? If, indeed, the Latin terms and forms of 
construction were much more difficult than such as must 
be substituted to supply their place, the objection would 
be a very strong one: but this is not really the case. 
In the declension of nouns we must have two cases, and 
in that of pronouns, three. Where would be the diffi- 
culty or embarrassment in extending the cases to six, the 
number of them in Latin. The answer will be, because 
we have no such cases in our language, and, therefore, 
why should we create them ? It may be replied, that a 
case or termination of a noun adds no more to its signi- 
fication than a preposition prefixed to it ; the difficulty 



60 anti-scepticism; on, 

then of adopting these cases is ideal : three more cases 
would be as easily learned as the two or three we are 
obliged to adopt; and, by doing so, we speak the general 
grammatical language of all the scholars in Europe : for 
it must be observed, that general utility, and not philo- 
sophical or abstract propriety, is the great object of 
grammar, as well as of language. 

" What has been observed of the cases of nouns is 
applicable to the declensions. We are obliged to form 
nouns into classes according to their several modes of 
forming their plurals; and as we have five varieties of 
this formation, where would be the impropriety of calling 
each of these modes a declension ? I greatly mistake, if 
putting each of these varieties in a table declined with 
all their cases, will not make a better and more lasting 
impression of the plurals and genitives of nouns, which 
are so often confounded, than the short transient way in 
which they are generally mentioned. 

" The moods of verbs in Latin, except the optative, 
have been generally retained by some of the most re- 
spectable English grammarians; notwithstanding the 
strong reasons which may be brought to prove, that we 
have no more than one mood in English. To abolish 
these moods would be certainly to coin our grammar 
anew ; but it is highly probable, that what it might gain 
by this in metaphysical value, it would lose in general 
currency. 

" It will scarcely be questioned, that for boys who are 
to have a Latin education, an English grammar in the 
Latin form would be by far the most eligible. But why, 
it will be said, should ladies be plagued with Latin terms 
and forms of construction ? Why ? it may be again an- 
swered, because they are as easily understood as any 



AN INQUIRY, &C. Gl 

other. What difficulty do we avoid by calling the noun 
or substantive, a name; the adjective, an adnoun or a 
quality ; the verb, an affirmation ; and the indeclinable 
parts of speech, particles? Are the leading state and 
the following state of the noun, which are very inadequate 
and erroneous terms, more easily conceived than the 
nominative and the accusative cases ? or is the case of 
the substantive or personal pronoun, when a question is 
asked, better apprehended by saying the leading state of 
the substantive or pronoun follows the affirmation, in- 
stead of coming before it ? One would think such egre- 
gious trifling as this could never have entered into the 
heads of men of sense. If these improvements then are 
merely visionary, I know not why ladies are to be in- 
structed by a grammar different from that of men, any 
more than that they should learn composition by a dif- 
ferent system of rhetoric." — Walker's Grammar ; Preface. 
But if there are persons who think, that, for the con- 
venience of students in the classics particularly, our lan- 
guage should be accommodated to the grammar of 
Greek and Latin, and strenuously contend for an equal 
number of cases with theirs, there are others who object 
to the plan in toto. 

" Though the Greeks and Romans," says the author 
of c A Treatise on the Etymology and Syntax of the 
English Language,' " expressed the different relations 
by variety of inflexion, which they termed cases, it does 
not follow, that we are to acknowledge the same number 
of cases as they had, when these relations are expressed 
in English, not by inflexions, but by prepositions, or 
words, significant of these relations. The Latins would 
not have acknowledged absque fruciu, without fruit, as 
forming a seventh case, though they acknowledged 



(32 anti-scepticism; or, 

fructu, by fruit, as making an ablative or sixth case. 
And why ? Because the latter only was formed by in- 
flexion. For this reason, I consider giving the name of 
dative case to the combination of words to a king, or of 
ablative case to the expression from a king to be a pal- 
pable impropriety. Our language knows no such cases; 
nor would an Englishman, unacquainted with Greek 
and Latin, ever dream of these cases, though perfectly 
master of his own language." — Second Edition, page 129. 

In further support of this latter opinion, it is said, by 
the compilers of " Systematic Education," that " if case 
mean a change in the word, to denote connexion with other 
words, then the plan of our language cannot be accom- 
modated to that of the Latin : if of a man, to a man, &c. 
be considered as cases, there is certainly no reason why 
the same appellation should not be given to every noun 
to which a preposition is prefixed, and then we shall 
have above thirty cases." 

The term case being derived from cado, grammarians 
affix to it the meaning of falling, i. e. say they, the fall- 
ing from the nominative : but if this is the accurate mean- 
ing of the term, it follows that in Latin the nominative 
itself, and the vocative (except that of the second declen- 
sion, whose nominative ends in us) and also the accusa- 
tive of neuter nouns, &c. are not cases: may not the 
meaning of the term more accurately be called the fall- 
ing out, the event or accident of the agent and object, as 
connected with the verb ? This explanation, it is con- 
ceived, accords with the notion w T hich grammarians en- 
tertain of the term syntax, as applied to the construction 
of a sentence; but the other, i. e. the falling from the 
nominative, accords with the notion which is generally 
entertained of the term etymology, and the formation of 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 63 

individual parts of speech. But the grammarians, in 
" Systematic Education," say, that " the variation of our 
nouns is confined to mark one relation, that of property 
or possession ; and it is, therefore, with great propriety, 
called the possessive case. The appellation, genitive 
case, is sometimes applied to it; but the force of thp 
Greek and Latin genitive is to denote relation in gene- 
ral, though capable of specific application, and is exactly 
equivalent to a noun preceded by of. The possessive case 
of a noun is not equivalent to the noun preceded by of, 
except where the latter has the specific force of belong- 
ing to. It may in all cases be represented by of with 
the noun following ; but the latter mode of expression 
cannot in many instances be represented by the posses- 
sive case." For the purpose of ascertaining the value of 
these objections, let us view them separately. With 
respect to the variation of our nouns as being confined 
to mark one relation, viz. that of property or possession, 
it may be said that in the part of speech, father's, is 
contained the force of two nouns differing in significa- 
tion, with the sign of between them. Whose advice is it ? 
a father's. The answer comprehends the second noun, 
advice. A father's advice. The answer, therefore, might 
have been given thus — The advice of a father. And this 
accords with the affirmation of Dr. Crombie, that " The 
relation which the English genitive most commonly de- 
notes, is that of property or possession." * It has been 

* " The nature of the relation, which the genitive expresses," says 
the same grammarian, " must, in some instances, be collected from the 
scope of the context ; for, in English, as in most other languages, this 
case frequently involves an ambiguity. When I say, ' neither life nor 
death shall separate us from the love of God,' it may mean, either from 
the^love which we owe to God, or the love which he bears to us ; for 
Gotfs love may denote either the relation which the affection bears to its 
subject, or that which it bears to its object. If the latter be the mean- 
ing intended, the ambiguity may be prevented by saying, ' love to God.' 



(j-t anti-scepticism; or, 

remarked by the late Walker (Grammar: page 10) 
u that the double genitive is an advantage peculiar to 
our language." But in this, it seems, he was mistaken : 
the German language has this advantage. " The Latins," 
says Walker, "can only say, corona regis,* and the 
French, la courronne du roi ; while the English can say, 
either the king's crown, or the a'own of the king." The 
Germans, also, can say, Des Konigs Krone, or Die Krone 
des Konigs. " Nor is the double genitive," continues 
Walker, a mere idle variety; for it not unfrequently 
indicates a very different relation of one thing to another. 
Thus, the king's picture may mean either his property or 



" An ambiguity likewise arises from it, as expressing either the rela- 
tion of the effect to its cause, or that of the accident to its subject. ' A 
little after the reformation of Luther/ says Swift. This may import 
either the change produced by Luther, or a change produced in him. 
The latter indeed is properly the meaning, though not that which was 
intended by the author. He should have said, ' the reformation by 
Luther.' It is clear, therefore, that the relation expressed by the geni- 
tive, is not uniformly the same, that the phrase may be interpreted 
either in an active or passive sense. Amor Dei denotes either amor quo 
Deus amat, or quo Deus amatur. — Reformatio Lutheri, either qua refor- 
rnavit, or qua reformatus est. Injuria patris, desiderium amici, with many 
other examples, which might be produced, have either an active or 
passive sense : rj ayaTrri th 0tS, Vamore di Dio, Vamour de Dieu, seve- 
rally involve the same ambiguity with ' the love of God.' The real im- 
port must be collected, not from the expression, but the context." — 
Rev. Dr. Crombie's Treatise on Etymology and Syntax, &c. page 45. 

* The Latins might have used one of their possessive adjectives: 
<: Corona regia." Thus Ovid — 

Nomine in Hectoreo pallida semper eram — 

I was always pale at Hector's name, or the name of Hector. 

This construction is very frequent among the poets ; it does not, how- 
ever, invalidate the remark of Walker. Corona Regia, strictly speak- 
ing, means kingly-crovrn, and " Nomine in Hectoreo" means, at the Hec- 
tor-name, or the Hectorean name. Thus, in English, we say, on a 
spring-morning, or spring's morning, or morning of spring; — at the cot- 
tage-door; i. e. the cottage's door, or the door of the cottage. This pro- 
cedure proves, that we have the possessive adjective besides the double 
genitive, mentioned by Walker.* Vide page 66 of this Treatise. 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 65 

his likeness; but, the picture of the king can mean only 
the likeness of the king." 

With respect to the general force and relationship of 
the Greek and Latin genitive, it may be affirmed, that 
all individual parts of speech have general relations and 
significations ; therefore, magistri, independently of any 
other part of speech, carries with it a general significa- 
tion; but it is to be added, that magistri, and every 
other genitive (including under the term the Greek ap- 
pellation, iItwk yn>m*) is always used in discourse in 
connexion with another noun, cither expressed or un- 
derstood; consequently, the genitive in Latin, as in 
English, is capable of specific application. The opinion 
that the Greek and Latin genitive is exactly equivalent 
to a noun in English, preceded by of appears to be in- 
correct. Unless of be immediately preceded by another 
substantive of different meaning, expressed or under- 
stood, it has not the force of a Latin genitive. A single 
sentence will prove it. I spoke of a master ; that is, the 
ablative de, of or concerning a master : de magistro. In 
this instance, therefore, of a master is not equivalent to 
the Greek and Latin genitive. 

Independently of this inaccurate application of the 
preposition of grammarians, in general, seem to have 
entertained but a very erroneous notion of the English 
genitive. They have found it difficult to trace always 
the common relation of belonging between one noun and 
another, and have hence concluded that the Latin geni- 
tive-relation of belonging does not actually exist in our 
language. The difficulty, I conceive, would, in a great 
measure, be removed, were we to attend more closely to 
the procedure of language, and to observe its changes 
as corresponding with the progress and modification of 

F 



66 anti-scepticism; or, 

thought. Let us conceive two nouns of different signi- 
fixations, not separated by the sign of; as the cottage 
door : the former has assumed the nature of an adjec- 
tive; but if these words were turned into Latin, the 
English adjective noun would be expressed by a noun 
in the genitive case : ostium cascc. In Latin, there is no 
adjective to correspond with the English word which 
has assumed the nature of an adjective. The procedure 
proves, that an English noun, followed immediately by 
another noun of different signification, is exactly equiva- 
lent to a Latin genitive. The cottage door means, there- 
fore, the cottage's door, or the door of the cottage. A 
spring morning signifies a morning of spring, or a spring's 
morning : an autumn morning signifies a morning of au- 
tumn, or autumn's morning. Autumn's morning, and 
spring's morning, sound harshly ; whereas the same 
words, s and the apostrophe being omitted, do not have 
the same effect^ an autumn morning, a spring morning. 
Winter's morning and summer's morning are familiar 
to the ear ; which prove the procedure of language, in 
this particular, to be what has been here stated. The 
former of two nouns not separated by the sign of, as the 
cottage door, was, without doubt, originally of the geni- 
tive or possessive case, with an apostrophe and 5 pre- 
fixed.* Which or whose door is this ? the cottage's, i. e. 
the cottage's door, or cottage door. According to ety- 
mologists, if the preposition of is derived from the Anglo- 
Saxon substantive afora, signifying offspring, &c. it is 
easy to conceive, that of, in all phrases like the following, 
implies the meaning of having, possessing, exemplifying, 
exhibiting, &c. Thus : " A man of honourable con- 

* It might, perhaps, be more correct to say. the ancient Saxon geni- 
tive termination es y \. e. without an apostrophe. 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 67 

duct." This phrase signifies " A man exemplifying or 
exhibiting honourable conduct." Here honourable is 
derived from the noun honour, and exemplifying or exhi- 
biting is a translated form of having or possessing, and is 
of a more active signification than the primitive qfora or 
offspring. " The man exhibits honourable actions :" 
i. e. the man, having, or possessing honour (honourable 
feeling) exhibits the actions of honour, or honourable 
actions. The truth is, the process of language is ex- 
ceedingly simple ; and may be resolved upon very easy 
principles : if, therefore, we wish to overcome difficulties, 
we must proceed upon first principles, and be content 
to reason like children. 

Now let us transcribe what the authors of the Eton 
Grammar have said of Latin nouns, in reference to those 
in English. " The nominative case cometh before the 
verb, and answereth to the question who ? or what ? as 
who teaches ? Magister docet, the master teaches." Here 
we perceive, that a direct application of the English 
grammar, upon the Latin plan, is made; and it must 
appear to every one, that the reference is just. Hence 
the propriety of the juvenile student's studying the 
English grammar as preparatory to that of the Latin. 
" The genitive case is known by the sign of, and answer- 
eth to the question whose ? or whereof P as whose learn- 
ing ? doctrina magistri, the learning of the master, or 
the master's learning." The definition of the genitive is 
not so accurate as its exemplification. It ought to have 
been expressed thus : The genitive case is known by the 
sign of placed between two substantives, in English, of 
different significations, the latter of which when it an- 
swers to the question whose, &c. The definition would 
then correspond with, Qzium duo substantiva diversce 

f 2 



68 Avri-scLPTicisji ; on, 

significationis, &c. " The dative case," says the Eton 
Grammar, " is known by the signs to or for, and an- 
swereth to the question to whom ? or to or for what ? 
as to whom do I give the book P Do librum viagistro, I 
give the book to the master." Here again it is presumed, 
that the student knows something of the English gram- 
mar : and the resemblance between the two languages is 
signified : nor can the resemblance be disputed : " The 
accusative followeth the verb, and answereth to the 
question whom ? or what ? whom do you love ? Amo 
magistrum, I love the master." Here the authors of the 
Eton Grammar have endeavoured to shew the analogy 
which subsists between the English part of speech master, 
in point of meaning or power, and magistrum. In Eng- 
lish, the construction of the sentence is the only guide to 
distinguish the accusative from the nominative noun : 
and this same remark applies to all neuter Latin nouns, 
singular and plural, and the plurals of the third and 
fourth declensions, &c. If case, therefore, should be said 
to mean "the falling off from the nominative," certainly 
these Latin accusatives are not cases. 

" The vocative case is known by calling or speaking 
to ; as O magister, O master." Here the two languages 
are completely analogous. " The ablative is known by 
prepositions, expressed or understood, serving to the 
ablative case; as de magistro, of the master; cm-am ma- 
gistro, before the master." " Also the prepositions in, 
with, from, by : and the word than, after the comparative 
degree, are signs of the ablative case."* 

* By avaiiirig each of their native tongue as a vehicle to the Latin,. 
P: isr ian taught Latin to the Greeks, and Alvarus to the Italians. And 
though we have never proceeded systematically upon this plan with our 
children, yet that we should do so, may appear, not only irora the e^ 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 69 

It must appear exceedingly evident, I conceive, to 
those who will take the trouble of examining thoroughly 
the plan of the Eton Grammar, that the authors have 
proceeded upon the supposition, that the Latin language 
<:an be taught in connexion with the English : and upon 
this principle the author of every Latin grammar has 
proceeded. The question, therefore, is — whether it is 
more philosophical, and more convenient for the classical 
student, that certain verbs should be said to govern 
nouns by the force of prepositions, or whether those 
nouns should be said to be governed entirely by prepo- 
sitions. With regard to the prepositions, which the 
Eton Grammar affirms to be the signs of the respective 
cases, not one of them has an accent ; and, though each 
of them on paper stands detached, every one of these 
prepositions is joined to the noun, and is actually pro- 
nounced with the article and the noun as one word. 
This will be best understood by a paradigm. 

Magister, Amaster. Magistri, Masters. 

Magistri, Ofamaster. 

Magistro, Toamaster. 

Magistram, Amaster. 

Magister, Omaster. 

Magistro, Byamaster. 

In pronouncing the declensions, both men and boys 
are accustomed (whether correctly or not, it is not requi- 
site here to determine) to accentuate those syllables 



Magistrorum, Ofmasters, &e. 
N.B. In the plural, nouns are 
not declined with the indefinite 
article : but those which are de- 
clined with the definite article, re- 
tain it in the plural. 



traordinary aptitude of our particles to the Latin governments, but more 
especially from this consideration, that whether we will deign pro- 
fessedly to teach them through the medium of our particles or no, it is 
actually through that medium we do teach them ; for during the early 
years of their tuition they can learn in no other way: With Lilly's 
three hundred Rules and Exceptions upon their tongue, it is to and by 
our particles alone they make mental application. — Rev. Richard Lyns's 
Latin Grammar; Preface. 



70 anti-scepticism; or, 

which mark the contradistinctions of cases: they say 
magistri, magistrb, &c. and of a master, to a master, &c. ; 
when they read sentences, they accentuate differently. 
In speaking and reading English, we say — " Follow | the 
advice | of a master." It is evident here, that the 
article is joined to advice, that the preposition and article 
are joined to master, and also, that the verb and nouns 
only have accents. " I gave it | to a master." The 
same remarks apply again. 

The accusative and nominative are alike, and have 
been before explained. The vocative, leaving out the 
o, is different from the nominative, because it has not 
an article. 

And thus stands the accentuation of the ablative. " It 
was spoken | by a master." 

All the plurals might of course be exemplified in the 
same way. 

Possibly, the reader will anticipate what I am now 
going to advance : if custom would, authorise the joining 
of English prepositions to nouns, on paper, in the way 
which I have shewn them to be actually joined by the 
voice in pronunciation and in reading, then the analogy 
between English and Latin nouns would be more easily 
recognized: it would be plainly understood, that the 
inflexions of English nouns are at the beginning of them ; 
those of the Latin nouns, at the end. Instead, there- 
fore, of saying a master' of , ox a master to, corresponding 
with the order of the inflexion in Latin nouns, we say 
of a master, to a master, &c. This candidly acknow- 
ledged to be the true state of the question, there is no 
plausible reason remaining, why the English grammar, 
as far as nouns are concerned, should not be systematized 
according to the Eton plan. With respect to the thirty 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 71 

cases corresponding to the number of prepositions, men- 
tioned by the objectors, the same argument would apply 
to the Latin. The following prepositions are succeeded 
by the Latin accusative, including of course all neuter 
nouns, &c. and these are like the nominative. Ad, ad- 
versum, adversus, ante, apud, circa, circum, circiter, cis, 
citra, contra, erga, extra, infra, inter, intra, juxta, oh, 
penes, per, pone, post, prater, prope, propter, secundum, 
secus, supra, trans, versus, ultra, usque. In Latin, these 
are affirmed to govern a neuter accusative, and the accu- 
sative plural of the third and fourth declensions ; why 
should they not be permitted to have the like power in 
the government of English accusatives ? The same may 
be remarked of those prepositions which have an ablative 
case after them. A, ab, abs, absque, coram, cum, de, e, 
ex, palam, prce, pro, sine, tenus, and also of those which 
serve to both cases. Clam, in for into, in for in only, 
sub, subter, super. My reason for citing the prepositions 
at length is to shew that the argument against the appel- 
lation of case, on account of the number of them, is not 
more objectionable in English than in Latin: and I 
cannot perceive any reasonable objection, why we should 
admit that nouns in English are governed in particular 
cases by the assistance or force of these prepositions. In 
the list of the Latin prepositions may be seen some few, 
which require two or three parts of speech to English 
them. Ob, because of, penes, in the powei- of, prope, 
near to, secundum, according to, trans, on the farther 
side, ex, out of, tenus, up to, as far as, clam, unknown to. 
It is evident that every one of these phrases has the force 
of a preposition ; and, also, that most of them should, 
in English, be parsed as prepositions; viz. because of, 



72 ANTI-SCEPTICISM ; OK, 

near to, according to,* out of, as Jar as — assisting the verb 
in the government of either the accusative or ablative 
case. 

To what has been already said respecting the verb, 
little needs be added. It is generally admitted, that with 
the help of auxiliaries, or signs of tenses, the English 
verb corresponds pretty closely with the Latin. The 
imperative, strictly speaking, has only one person ; and 
here the English language, most unquestionably, has an 
advantage over the Greek and Latin. " Let me go, or 
let thou me to go ; go, or go thou ; let him go, or let thou 
him to go ; let us go, or let ye us to go ; go, or go ye; let 
them go, or let ye them to go." 

Every person of a verb in Latin, of any tense and 
mood, requires in English two or more parts of speech 
to express its meaning, and yet these English parts of 
speech are joined together in pronunciation, and have 
only one accent. Thus, monui may signify, / have ad- 
vised him ; representing to us four separate English parts 
of speech; but in pronouncing them, the parts of speech 
are united, and are recognized by the ear as one word, 
with the accent on the penultimate syllable, i" have ad- 
vised him. In parsing, therefore, the verb of this sen- 
tence, / have advised him, it would not be inconvenient, 
I conceive, to call have a sign of the preter or perfect 
tense, and " have advised," taken together, a verb. The 
same remarks are applicable to all the rest of the persons 
and tenses of English verbs. 

With regard to the construction of sentences, there 
are certain rules which hold good in all languages. 

* "According to" will be found in Johnson's Dictionary as a prepo- 
sition. 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 73 

" The verb agrees with its nominative case in number 
and person : when two verbs come together, the latter is 
in the infinitive mood : the verb to he has the same case 
after it that goes before it : the relative agrees with the 
antecedent in gender, number, and person ; — and a few 
others. These rules, which are in all languages, and in 
the nature of things, are very different from that govern- 
ment of words peculiar to the Greek and Latin lan- 
guages; in the former of which a neuter, and sometimes 
a masculine or feminine substantive in the plural num- 
ber, requires a verb singular ; and in the latter, not only 
adjectives, but adverbs and interjections govern the cases 
of nouns. The case absolute in the Latin is the ablative; 
in the Greek, the genitive; and in English, the nomi- 
native. It would, therefore, be the height of absurdity 
to follow the syntax of these languages, any farther than 
they follow the syntax of all other languages; and in 
these, if we adopt the same terms, it is because they are 
more universally known than any other." These out- 
lines the author* did not judiciously fill up: but the 
deficiencies might be easily supplied by the aid of the 
valuable syntax and remarks of the Rev. Dr. Crombie.* 

Most persons, it is presumed, will be ready to admit, 
that, in the lower schools, where the classics are not 
studied by the pupils, the arrangement of our present 
English grammars will answer most common purposes, 
and, as far as they proceed, be more easy of compre- 
hension than one formed upon the plan of the Eton 
Latin Grammar. But it is also to be admitted, that the 
term " easy" is only of comparative signification ; for it 
has not been presumed, that so philosophic a know- 

* Walker. 



74 anti-scepticism; or, 

ledge of language can be obtained by the plan of Dr. 
Ash, Dr. Lowth, or Mr. L. Murray, as by the plan of 
that which has' been just named. The present mode of 
teaching the grammar of our vernacular language is 
easy in the same degree, as the present method of teach- 
ing Latin prosody is easy; viz. the custom of pro- 
nouncing the penultimate vowel long of all Latin words 
of two syllables, and one consonant in the middle, with- 
out any regard to quantity ; and the custom of pro- 
nouncing the antepenultimate vowel short of all Latin 
words of three syllables, followed by a single consonant, 
without any regard to quantity : thus, the genitive sin- 
gular of rex, and the second person singular of the pre- 
sent tense of Rego, are both pronounced alike: i. e. 
long ; Regis : though every little boy in the second form is 
able to tell the master, that the penultimate vowel of the 
former is long, and that of the latter is short : and on 
the other hand, the antepenultimate vowel of regibus is 
pronounced exactly the same as that of the infinitive of 
rego, though the vowel in regibus is long, and that in 
regere is short. These anomalous methods of pro- 
nouncing the penultimate and antepenultimate vowels, 
succeeded by one consonant, are almost uniformly 
adopted and patronized in our public schools ; and thus 
the eye and the ear are constantly at variance.* It is 
repeated that the present method of teaching English 
grammar is easy in the same degree as the present 
method of teaching Latin prosody is easy ; either is only 
of comparative utility. 

* A reformation in this particular is now being effected in some of 
eur schools. I believe I am authorised in saying, that it receives the 
powerful sanction of Dr. Russell, head master of the Charter-House. 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 15 



CHAP. IX. 

Sentences — the opinion that ever)- sentence is a factitious word contro- 
verted — Burke — the unity essential to a thinking being is not requi- 
site to the operations of a thinking being — ellipsis of the verb " to 
be" — sentences of childhood — opinion that the imperatives, go, hark, 
&c. are virtual sentences — this opinion controverted — order of words 
analogous to the operations of intellect — elucidations — and conclusion 
of the argument. 

HERE we might proceed to discuss other subjects, 
and to reflect upon the changes and diversities of lan- 
guage ; but, prior to this, it seems requisite to say a few 
words concerning the construction of sentences as con- 
nected with the progress of intellect. 

In a work which is already before the public, I have 
adopted the analytical arrangement of the compact and 
loose sentences of Walker ; from what has been advanced 
in this Treatise, it will be seen that I have not had oc- 
casion to alter the opinion. The conceptions, which my 
inquiries have led me to adopt respecting language, still 
continue to be precisely the same as those of Walker, 
and, consequently, different from the opinions of any 
writer, " whose views of the nature of language" have 
disposed him to regard every sentence as forming "a 
factitious word." In unison with this latter opinion, I 
have lately read, " that if language, in its progress 
towards perfection, could have proceeded on the pattern 
of nature, it must have invented a word for every sen- 
timent that was to be expressed, which word would 
have been proper for that sentiment, and for none other." 
On another occasion, the same writer, I believe, main- 
tains that "the words composing any sentence are on 
the footing of letters composing a word. The two case* 



76 ANTI-SCEPTICISM$ OR, 

would indeed be exactly parallel," says the writer, " were 
every person allowed to follow his own fancy in the 
spelling of words ; but the rules of orthography are 
fixed, and they alone spell correctly, who spell in one 
particular way. But in the spelling of his thoughts by 
words, every person is allowed to follow his own method." 
This is fortunate : but if I might be permitted to pro- 
pose a question, I should ask " whose method else could 
he follow?" Hortensius would tell us that few can 
examine into the nature of their thoughts; and that even 
in the use of instituted language, men frequently make 
use of words without any clear, correspondent ideas at- 
tached to them : disputation or confusion is the result. 
But it will \)e retorted, that " an apparatus that requires 
and implies so much art in the management, little ac- 
cords, on many occasions, with the fervour and rapidity 
of our thoughts. If the passion is violent, we give it 
vent in short abrupt sentences, which, from constant use, 
suggest themselves as readily as the language of nature ; 
still they are far from being adequate to our purpose, 
because they exhibit the circumstances by which we are 
influenced only by starts and fits; we want the one 
word that shall lay bare the mind in a moment; but it 
cannot be found, and we have only to avail ourselves of 
the best means in our power to supply its place." It is 
difficult to conceive, how, upon such a notion of lan- 
guage and thought as these extracts convey, a tIieo?y of 
elocution should have been formed : that such an attempt, 
however, has been made, will appear from the following 
compendium: — " A sentence, in point of expression, is 
but a single word, the parts of which it is composed 
being merely grammatical divisions, more or less closely 
connected in this respect, but not at all related to any 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 77 

correspondent division in the thought, which, in their 
united capacity, they serve to express. As to pronun- 
ciation, therefore, we may expect that a sentence will be 
liable to the same affections as a single, independent 
word, and, making the necessary allowances of length, 
this will be found universally the case." Admitting, for 
one moment, the former theory to be sound, an appli- 
cation of it to the rules of pronunciation and delivery, is 
altogether out of the question. There is not, in my 
opinion, the slightest analogy whatever between the pro- 
nunciation or expression of an individual part of speech, 
and the various characters of the voice, its respirations, 
breaks, and pauses, in the utterance of a sentence : and 
the truth of this position more strongly appears, when we 
take into consideration the nature of some of the promi- 
nent tropes and figures in rhetoric as blended with the 
oratorical delivery of a sentence. A discussion of these 
points, however, does not belong fb the object of this 
Treatise; at present I shall merely confine myself to the 
former theory, promising to recur to the points connected 
with elocution at some future period. 

The five elementary parts of speech cler.rly elucidate 
the essential principles of grammar. But these elements, 
placed in their analogous order, relate only to simple 
thoughts, and simple individual propositions. It has 
been shewn, that when we proceed to reason on the 
simple proposition, the order of words is, in some 
measure, broken ; and supernumerary particles are then 
adopted, to connect and unite words into another form 
of phraseology : of which parts of speech, the adjective, 
the substantive, and the verb, grammarians regulate and 
form into sentences, by the two general rules of concord 
and government. These, I have endeavoured to prove a , 



78 anti-scepticism; or, 

may, with the greatest propriety, be modelled on the 
prominent principles of the Eton Latin Grammar. 

Each sort of sentence, strictly speaking, conveys only 
one thought : but the procedure of language in express- 
ing thought is exceedingly varied. " A man seldom 
detects a pleasing error." We perceive, that the exam- 
ple, placed within the signs of quotation, conveys to the 
mind but one thought. If the example be altered thus : 
" A man never detects a pleasing error," the logical de- 
duction of the proposition appears false or doubtful, and 
the qualifying clause, " till reflexion operates," is requi- 
site to be added, that the thought may be rendered just 
and true. The following example conveys one thought 
only, but two efforts of the mind are requisite to com- 
plete it. " There is a vigilance of observation, and ac- 
curacy of distinction, which books and precepts cannot 
confer; and from this, almost all original and native 
excellence proceeds." The construction may be so 
altered, as shall enable one effort of the mind to compre- 
hend and complete the whole sentence. " Almost all 
original and native excellence proceeds from a certain 
vigilance of observation and accuracy of distinction, 
which books and precepts cannot confer." These two 
or three examples prove how very various is the pro- 
cedure of language in the communication of thought. 
" There are but few men," says the writer Hortensius,* 
" who are masters of the tongue they daily use, and 
fewer still who can give a rational account of their own 
thoughts : they cannot examine into the nature of their 
thoughts, for it is not in their power to unravel them. 
Hence the frequent use they make of words without any 

* Deinology : or the Union of Reason and Elegance j by Hortensius ; 
page 108 : published 1789, by Robinson and Co. 



AN INQUIRY, &C 79 

clear, correspondent ideas attached to them ; or if they 
have a clear idea of an object, they are at a loss for the 
true term that expresses it. Their meaning is guessed 
at and generally mistaken ; disputation ensues, and the 
result is confusion." And yet another writer conceives, 
that our thoughts are of so determined a character, as 
that the natural expression of any individual thought is 
Capable of being identified with the utterance of a single 
word. But strange as it may probably appear to an 
individual entertaining such a doctrine, the author of 
the Sublime and Beautiful was of opinion, " that we are 
often at a loss to know what ideas we have of things, or 
whether we have any ideas at all upon some subjects." 
It is nevertheless to be admitted, that every separate 
word, as it stands united with others in a sentence, does 
not of itself convey a definite meaning. Nor do the five 
elementary parts of speech, used collectively and in their 
analogous order, convey a definite signification : they 
require restrictive particles and relatives to limit the sum 
total of thought. This also was well understood by 
Burke : and he expressed himself in such a manner, that 
few could fail of interpreting his meaning : — " It is im- 
possible," says he, " in the rapidity and quick succession 
of words in conversation, to have ideas both of the sound 
of the word, and of the thing represented ; besides, some 
words, expressing real essences, are so mixed with others 
of a general and nominal import, that it is impracticable 
to jump from sense to thought, from particulars to gene- 
rals, from things to words, in such a manner as to an- 
swer the purposes of life: nor is it necessary that we 
should." Part 5, sec. 5, Sublime and Beautiful. — 
And yet, with great judgment, the same writer has af- 
firmed, " that it is hard to repeat certain words, though 



V 



80 anti-scepticism; or, 

owned by themselves unoperative, without being in some 
degree affected, especially if a warm and affecting voice 
accompanies them; as suppose wise, valiant, generous, 
good, and great. These words, by having no applica- 
tion, ought to be unoperative; but when words com- 
monly sacred to great occasions are used, we are affected 
by them, even without the occasion. When words, 
which have been generally so applied, are put together 
without any rational view, or in such a manner, that 
they do not rightly agree with each other, the style is 
called bombast. And it requires, in several cases, much 
good sense and experience to be guarded against the 
force of such language ; for when propriety is neglected, 
a greater number of these affecting words may be taken 
into the service, and a greater variety may be indulged 
in combining them." Subloie and Beautiful, part 
the 5th, sec. 3. 

The soul of man is essentially indivisible; and al- 
though it is endued with distinct faculties, yet, as we 
have before said, there is no absolute division in the soul 
itself, for it is the whole soul that wills, thinks, or re- 
members. " No man," says the author of the Remarks 
on Scepticism, " can think in two separate places at the 
same time; nor again, is his consciousness made up of 
a number of separate consciousnesses ; as the solidity, 
the colour, and motion of the whole body is made up of 
the distinct solidities, colours, and motions of its parts." 
Remarks on Scepticism, page 89. — The unity which is 
essential to a thinking being, forms a very principal argu- 
ment against the absurd doctrines of materialism. But 
this unity is not essentially requisite to the operations 
of a thinking being. We are not acquainted with the 
precise boundaries of the operations of intellect; neither 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 81 

do we know at all times, the actual limits nor extensive- 
ness of any one of our individual thoughts. The fact is, 
generally speaking, we hardly know what our thoughts 
are ; at least, all that we know of them is by parts ; and 
if we happen to be blinded by either appetite or passion, 
we know not even the good or evil tendency of any one 
particular thought. If these premises be granted, it will 
then unquestionably follow, that the vocal expression of 
intellect must be composed of parts, to correspond with 
the progress and completion of thought, and that a 
single word would be altogether inadequate for the pur- 
pose. But it has been already said that the mere naming 
of an object amounts to no one part of intellect or 
thought, or the expression of it ; the thing must be said ^ 
to live ; it must be affirmed to have or have not existence ; 
language must give or deny it being, acting, or suffer- 
ance ; and it is not in the power of one single external 
sign to effect this: further, to effect the most simple 
purposes of communication, another sign must be em- 
ployed, either expressed or understood. It is to be here 
noticed, that the writer whose singular opinions I am 
now opposing, affirms, that " the verb is itself a sen- 
tence, as are the imperatives go, come, forbear, hark! 
hist!" &c. " that it is the only part of speech which is 
capable, on occasion, of being by itself a word" (sen-*"' 
tence). Without resting on the authority of gram- 
marians, who say, that the imperative mood is nothing 
more nor less than the simple verbal name, unattended 
with the inference of affirmation — and that if we say to 
a servant " Bread, or bring some bread," nothing more is 
intended than that we wish him to bring us bread, — the 
object only being named in the first instance, and the 
name of the action as well as the object, in the second ;— 

G 



anti-scepticism; or, 

I say, without resting on nice philological distinctions, it 
is merely requisite to state, that the individual parts of 
speech, bread! as in the above instance, silence ! order ! 
&c. and vocative cases, especially as in calling a servant, 
Thomas! John! &c. are all as much sentences as the 
imperatives go, come, &c. " In order to suit the pur- 
poses of speech, the verb," it is said, " is made capable 
of being less comprehensive, and instead of being itself a 
sentence, it can, when necessary, be a mere sign to indi- 
cate a sentence." In the examples, " George is tally 
George is walking, the artificial verb," it is added, 
" merely indicates that a thought or judgment is ex- 
pressed ; for the phrases tall Geojge and George walking, 
sufficiently designate the objects conceived, and it is 
only the absence of the artificial verb, that forbids them 
to be understood as sentences." The general tenour of 
this remark applies only to the construction of English-; 
and not to the nature and philosophy of language ia 
general. It may, notwithstanding, be remarked, that 
tall George and George walking are not analogous terms ; 
walking George would be analogous, in construction, 
to the term tall. George. Tall George is a mere name, 
and nothing else; but George walking, I apprehend, is 
something more. The participial adjective following 
the noun, the order is not the English order. Some- 
thing appears to be affirmed of George, viz. that he is 
walking. Little children uniformly leave out the verb 
in their first attempts to unite words in a sentence, 
" George walking, mamma :" and this sentence, I conceive, 
every parent w r ould understand. This exactly accords 
with the idiomatic construction of Greek and Latin, and 
particularly with that of the Hebrew language. Indeed,, 
as the compilers of Systematic Education have remarked,, 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 83 

" The connecting link in language needs not always be 
stated. In the infancy of language it could not exist: 
and in the language of childhood it does not exist. 
Words are joined together, and it is easily understood, 
that the corresponding ideas are connected in the mind. 
6 Mother milk good,' would surely be understood by 
any one; and, in similar cases, depending upon the case 
of inference, the ancient writers left it to the mind of the 
reader to form it for himself." But it is asserted, that 
" without the aid of a verb, the word (sentence) cannot 
be formed," and that the verb is " the only part of speech 
w r hich is capable, on occasion, of being by itself a word" 
(sentence). " Mr. Speaker ! My Lord and Gentlemen of 
the Jury /" Each of these phrases is elliptical, and each 
may be called a virtual sentence — more so, I am in- 
clined to think, than the imperatives, go, come, &c. 
Sentences of this sort' are exceedingly common in the 
Hebrew construction. The scholar needs not be told, 
that the ellipsis of the verb to be occurs continually in 
the Greek and Latin languages : in the Hebrew writings 
it is observable almost in every verse. " Howl, O gate, 
cry, O city; thou whole Palestina (art) dissolved; for 
there shall come from the north a smoke, and none 
(shall be) alone in his appointed times." Isaiah 14. — 
" In God (is) my salvation and my glory ; the rock of 
my strength (and) my refuge (is) in God. Trust in him 
at all times ; ye people, pour out your heart before him : 
God (is) a refuge for us. Surely men of low degree 
(are) vanity, (and) men of high degree (are) a lie : to be 
laid in the balance, they (are) altogether (lighter) than 
vanity." Ps. 62. — But there are ellipses in the sacred 
writings more striking than these: viz. as in the first 
four verses of the Proverbs, and Psalm 109 and 4th verse. 

g2 



34- anti-scepticism; or, 

" The Proverbs of Solomon, the son of David, king 
of Israel ; 

To know wisdom and instruction, to perceive the 
words of understanding ; 

To receive the instruction of wisdom, justice, and 
judgment, and equity; 

To give subtilty to the simple, to the young man 
knowledge and discretion." 

„ In these four verses the principal verb or sign of 
affirmation is not, even in our translation, expressed, 
but understood* The ellipsis in the fourth verse of the 
109th Psalm is exceedingly striking i — "I {give myself 
unto) prayer." 

We have before stated, that every separate word, as it 
stands connected with others in a sentence, does not of 
itself convey a definite meaning; but it is not to be 
understood, that the general order of each word in a 
sentence is dissimilar to the order and progress of every 
operation or act in the thought; for this would be to 
destroy all analogy whatever, and all grammatical con- 
struction. Still, possibly, it may be again said, that a 
thought is one ,♦ that there is no division in a thought, 
nor is a thought capable . of being divided. What, 
therefore, cannot be divided, must not be said to have 
parts. It is one. Without recurring to what has been 
before advanced on the unity of a thinking being, and, on 
the other hand, on our total incompetency oftentimes to 
examine into the nature of our thoughts, we will endea- 
vour to prove at once, by actual experiment, that all 
which we can know of the growth and progress of the 
mind, is by calmly attending to its incessant operations 
while it is developing and expressing the limits or ex- 
tensiveness of an individual thought, as set forth in a 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 85 

sentence. Let us begin with the following example: — 
" The men who can be charged with the fewest failings, 
are generally most ready to make allowances for them." 
That the inference intended to be drawn from this as- 
semblage of words may be perfectly understood, we will 
attach a definite signification to the part of speech 
"failings" limiting the meaning of it to that of virtue. 
This sentence then, so restricted, is acknowledged to 
express the precise and actual thought of the speaker. 
Now, then, let us imagine the speaker as beginning to 
express this actual thought, this thought not to be di- 
vided ; this thought which positively exists in his mind 
at the moment of commencing the sentence. " The 
men who can be charged with the fewest failings" — at 
the very instant of pronouncing the part of speech 
"failings" the thought of the speaker, which, in the 
first instance, was limited, now becomes general; i. e. 
failings either with respect to abilities or virtue : the sen- 
tence, or expression of the thought, now stands thus : — 
« The men who can be charged with the fewest failings, 
either with respect to abilities or virtue, are generally 
most ready to make allowances for them." As another 
example, let us take the following sentence : — 

" Criticism, though dignified from the earliest ages by 
the labours of men eminent for knowledge and sagacity, 
and since the revival x>f polite literature, the favourite 
study of European scholars, has not yet attained the 
certainty and stability of science." The substance of 
the original thought is evidently contained in the follow- 
ing reduced form : — " Criticism has not yet attained the 
certainty and stability of science." But at the instant of 
pronouncing the word " criticism" the thought of the 
speaker is augmented ; " though dignified from the 



86 anti-scepticism; or, 

earliest ages by the labours of men eminent for know- 
ledge and sagacity:" and in pronouncing the words 
" earliest ages" or some word in the latter part of the 
same clause, the succeeding clause is suggested to the 
speaker's mind : viz. " and since the revival of polite 
literature, the favourite study of European scholars." 
The following arrangement of words in the writings of 
Lord Shaftsbury, will afford us a striking instance of 
the progress of intellect during the utterance of a sen- 
tence. The writer is giving advice to an author ; and 
is speaking of modern poets as compared with the an- 
cient. " If they secretly advise, and give instruction, 
they may be esteemed the best and most honourable 
among men." We will suppose, as before, that at the 
utterance of the first syllable, these words convey the 
sum total of a thought existing in the speaker's mind. 
But the operations of thought are swift, like lightning : 
during the utterance of the unaccentuated syllable, " if," 
the clause, " 'while they profess only to please" suggests 
itself. " If, while they profess only to please, they 
secretly advise, and give instruction, they may"- — here, 
as before, the thought receives fresh modification, " now, 
perhaps, as well as formerly be esteemed" — The ad- 
verbial phrase, " with justice," now occurs to the speaker's 
mind — " with justice, the best and most honourable 
among authors." The sentence, expressive of the thought, 
modified and completed, stands thus : 

" If, while they profess only to please, they secretly 
advise, and give instruction, they may, now, perhaps, as 
well as formerly, be esteemed, with justice, the best and 
most honourable among authors." 

Dr. Blair pronounces this to be a well-constructed 
sentence, for the words seem to flow in a very perspi- 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 87 

cuous and natural order : the sentence contains a great 
many circumstances and adverbs, says Dr. Blair, which 
are necessary to qualify the meaning; only, secretly, 
as well, perhaps, now, with justice, formerly ; yet these are 
placed with so much art, as neither to embarrass nor 
weaken the sentence; while that which is the capital 
object in it, viz. " Poets being justly esteemed the best 
and most honourable among authors," comes out clear 
and detached, and possesses its proper place. 

Let us take another sentence, and one of different 
construction : 

1/ " Remember well, 

The noble lessons by affliction taught : 
Preserve the quick humanity it gives, 
The pitying social sense of human weakness ; 
Yet keep thy generous fortitude entire, 
The manly heart, that to another's woe 
Is tender as superior to its own." 

This sentence may be viewed either as presenting one 
entire picture of the speaker's mind, at the time when he 
commenced the sentence, or as exhibiting the progress 
of his mind as the sentence proceeds. In the former 
instance, the members of the sentence would be com- 
pletely united, and this would be indicated by the 
speaker's utterance : that is to say, the third and fourth 
lines would be pronounced as a concession, and the fifth 
line as the assertion following it. According to this 
method of interpreting the meaning of the sentence, the 
voice would seem to connect the parts before and after 
the concession and assertion, with as much perspicuity 
as though the construction had been assisted by some- 
thing like the following intervening parts of speech : — 



anti-scepticism; or, 

" Remember well, 
The noble lessons by affliction taught : 
{that is, ichile you) 

Preserve the quick humanity it gives, 
The pitying, social sense of human weakness : 
Yet (remember to) keep thy generous fortitude entire, 
(because) The manly heart, that to another's woe 
Is tender as superior to its own." _ 

But if the sentence be viewed as exhibiting the pro- 
gress and modification of the speaker's mind as he pro- 
ceeds in the utterance of it, the members of the sentence 
would be detached, and this would be signified by the 
inflexions of the voice. Thus, the following two lines, 
" Preserve the quick humanity it gives, 
The pitying social sense of human weakness ;" 
Would not be viewed as a concession, but rather as an 
amplification of the words which they follow : viz* 

" Hemember well 
The noble lessons by affliction taught :" 
And the succeeding clause, 

" Yet keep thy generous fortitude entire," 
Would not signify an assertion ,• it would be merely an 
addition, or correction. The concluding two lines, as- 
sume the office of explaining the amplification and cor- 
rection; i. e. the lines which they immediately follow. 
This method of reading the passage is altogether collo- 
quial, and very unlike that which has been before ex- 
plained. And though the procedure of thought is dif- 
ferent, yet it may easily be perceived, that the sum total 
of thought or meaning in either, is the same. Now let 
it be asked, what word or individual expression could 
be adopted to correspond with this varied procedure oi 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 89 

thought and intellect ? It is plain that the most simple 
sentence, whether it be affirmative or negative, cannot 
be formed without a sign, either expressed or under- 
stood, to signify the life and being of the substantive. 
" The sun shines" Though the assertion in this sen- 
tence were to be denied, the process, as far as relates to 
the signifying of the life and being of the substantive, is 
the same. The sun shines not. If the part of speech 
shines be omitted, and the negation be immediately an- 
nexed to the substantive, viz. " The sun not" and this 
be called a sentence, the meaning would not be the 
direct contrary of that in the former sentence, viz. 
The sun shines, but according to the Hebrew idiom, it 
would be reduced to — The sun is not — the simple, or 
primitive sign of affirmation, is, being understood. In 
the first instance of language, the primitive part of 
speech, the substantive, was, doubtless, a virtual sen- 
tence ; the verb, or life of the substantive, being implied 
by gesticulation. The most simple sentence which can 
be devised, as expressive of the most elementary thought 
or proposition, must be composed, therefore, of at least 
two signs or parts of speech ; that is to say, the substan- 
tive and the verb, one of them expressed, and the other 
either expressed or understood : it follows, that as one 
word or individual sign, having no relation to another 
word or sign understood, is insufficient for the purpose 
of communicating the most elementary thought or pro- 
position ; so one word or individual sign cannot be suf- 
ficient for the purpose of communicating the varied pro- 
cedure of thought and intellect, as employed in logical 
and rhetorical science, and as exhibited in the construc- 
tion of almost every sentence composed of alphabetic 



90 anti-scepticism; or, 

words. Here the present point of discussion ends, and 
with it I transcribe the language of Dr. Blair : 

" Did men always think clearly," says this author, 
" and were they, at the same time, fully masters of the 
language in which they write, they would then, of course, 
acquire all those properties of precision, unity, and 
strength, which are so much recommended. For we may 
rest assured, that whenever we express ourselves ill, 
there is, besides the mismanagement of language, for the 
most part, some mistake in our manner of conceiving 
the subject. Embarrassed, obscure, and feeble sen- 
tences are generally, if not always, the result of embar- 
rassed, obscure, and feeble thought. Thought and lan- 
guage act and re-act upon each other mutually. Logic 
and rhetoric have here, as in many other cases, a strict 
connexion ; and he that has learning to arrange his sen- 
tences with accuracy and order, has learning at the same 
time, to think with accuracy and order." 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 91 

CHAP. X. 

Question respecting the origin of language — was it invented by man, 
or was it revealed to him by his Creator ? — atheistical philosophy — 
remarks of Johnson — Selkirk — Juan Fernandez — the young man 
caught in the woods of Hanover — in France— arguments drawn 
from these circumstances, and from Genesis, chap 2.— the know- 
ledge and use of any language to be improved by an acquaintance 
with other languages— primitive language — the Scriptures afford 
the safest arguments respecting the transmission of it — writers on 
this subject not corresponding in their opinions — the claims 
of different nations — Arabians — Syrians — Ethiopians — Armenians 
and the Jews — etymology of names considered — the name of Ba- 
bel — and the names which are assigned by Moses to eastern coun- 
tries, &c. — proved by Mr. Maurice to be the very names by which 
they were anciently known over all the east. 

A HERE are questions yet remaining, which seem to 
be justly related to the topics already discussed, and 
which are closely connected with an inquiry concerning 
the nature and philosophy of language. It is interesting 
to know, by what means, in the first ages of the world, 
did man learn to speak ? Was language invented by 
man, or was it revealed to him by his Creator? Next 
to these questions, in point of interest, is that respecting 
the primitive language ; — Has the primitive language 
been transmitted to the latter ages, or is it extinct? In 
pursuing these topics, we shall be naturally led to a 
consideration of those circumstances which caused the 
changes and tbe diversity of tongues. 

Respecting the origin of language, there can be but 
two opinions : either language must have been invented 
by man, or it must have been revealed to him by his 
Creator. 

The ancient and modern professors of atheistical phi- 
losophy represent the faculty of articulate speech, or 



92 ANTI-SCErTICISM ; OR, 

language, as the mere institutive expression of the wants 
and desires of a herd of associated savages, gradually in- 
vented for mutual convenience of communication, and 
established by mutual consent. * But our great lexico- 
grapher justly remarks, that " language must have come 
by inspiration : a thousand, nay million of children, 
could not invent a language ; while the organs are 
pliable, there is not understanding enough to form a 
language ; and by the time there is understanding 
enough, the organs are grown stiff." This is confirmed 
by experience. " Alexander Selkirk, when cast away 
on the desert island of Juan Fernandez, after some 
years' residence, almost lost the use of his native tongue. 
The young savage, called Peter, caught in the woods of 
Hanover several years ago, though soon tamed and re- 
conciled lo society, never could be taught to speak. 
And lately, the young savage of Aveyron, in France, 
though put under the care of the celebrated Sicard, 
master of the deaf and dumb school, has never yet been 
observed to utter an articulate sound, not even to express 
his most urgent wants." — jyOyly and Mant. 

But that language was revealed to man by his Creator, 
may be proved from two circumstances: 1st. Because 
the Sacred History relates, that man exercised the fa- 
culty of speech in his solitary state : and 2dly. Because 
the same history mentions, that after Eve was brought 
to Adam, he said, "Therefore shall a man leave his 
father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife : 
and they shall be one flesh ;" which passage signifies not 
only that the language of Adam was revealed to him, but 
that it must have been more copious and perfect than 

* D'Oyly and M ant's Bible. 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 93 

what has been generally inferred. Now we know, from the 
instances of Selkirk, Peter the wild boy, and the young 
savage of France, the circumstances which have been 
recently named, that the solitary state is altogether un- 
favourable to language ; indeed, as language is the me- 
dium of communication, we may safely conclude, that, in 
his solitary state, language is unnatural to man, and, 
therefore, must have been revealed to him : and as Adam 
from positive experience, that is, by " sensation and re- 
flexion," could have known nothing of father and mother, 
although he spoke of them before the birth of Cain, and 
intimated that the ties of husband and wife would be 
greater than the affections of children and parents, it 
most unquestionably follows, that language was not only 
revealed to man by his Creator, but also, that, originally, 
it must have been more copious and perfect than is ge- 
nerally believed. 

If this conclusion is accurate, it will, doubtless, be 
perceived, that it is productive of many interesting ques- 
tions : all of which would require the superior abilities 
of the greatest metaphysicians of the day, to discuss and 
do ample justice to them. They do not, however, be- 
long to the present inquiry ; a circumstance exceedingly 
fortunate to the Writer of this Treatise. 

That a more correct knowledge and use of any lan- 
guage, may, with greater facility, be accomplished by an 
acquaintance with other languages than without them, is 
a position invariably received by the grammarians of all 
enlightened nations : and the advantage which is to be 
derived in the study of English from an intimacy with 
the Greek and Latin in particular, would be more than 
equally obtained from an acquaintance with the primitive 
language of mankind, were it transmitted to us. But 



94; anti-scepticism; or, 

respecting this transmission, the Scriptures, the only true 
sources whence information of this nature is to be de- 
rived, are altogether silent; and the opinions and con- 
jectures of those who have directed their attention to the 
subject, do not, by any means, correspond with each 
other. A few remarks, therefore, in repetition of some 
of the popular arguments on this interesting topic, will 
assist in rendering the succeeding considerations more 
easily admissible, and altogether free from ambiguity. 

The Arabians, the Syrians, the Ethiopians, the Ar- 
menians, and several other nations (as well as some 
Europeans) dispute, all in their turns, for their respective 
languages ; but the Jews are the people who assert the 
antiquity and excellence of theirs, with the greatest 
warmth and vigour.* They maintain, that it was im- 
mediately invested by God ; that he himself spoke it ; 
for which reason it is called holy; that it is the only 
language understood by the angels, and wherein we can 
pray and be heard with effect; it is that wherein the 
blessed in heaven converse, and wherein every nation, at 
the general resurrection, shall speak. But waving these 
fabulous notions — some authors f have maintained, that 
the Hebrew tongue was the most ancient in the world, 
the very same which was spoken by Adam and Noah, and 
preserved in the family of Heber ; who formed a society 
distinct from these, that had suffered in the confusion of 
Babel, and so transmitted it pure to their posterity. And 
for the confirmation of this, they produce the names and 
etymologies of certain persons and things, which have 

* F. Simon's Critical History. Buxtorf de Ling. Hebr. Orig.— 
Stackhouse. 

t Chrys. torn. 2, Homil. 30. Augustinus de Civit. Dei. Selden de 
Syned. lib. ii. 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 95 

some kind of affinity, and which Moses himself derives 
from the Hebrew. 

To obviate this argument, taken from the etymology 
of names, we may observe, that those which seem to 
agree best with the Hebrew tongue, are not so much 
proper names, which children received at their birth, to 
distinguish them from all other people, as they are sir- 
names, which were bestowed upom them, for some particular 
event or accident that bejel them ; that by these, they were 
afterwards known to posterity, and so in process of time, 
they came to be looked upon as proper names. Thus 
Adam, for instance, is unquestionably no proper name. 
(Le Clerc's Dissertations.) — That Adam is not a proper 
name may be proved from the first two verses of the fifth 
chapter of Genesis : — " This is the book of the genera- 
tions of Adam : in the day that God created man, in the 
likeness of God made he him. Male and female created 
he them, and blessed them, and called their name Adam, 
in the day when they were created." Adam, i. e. man j 
like homo, the common name in Latin to both sexes. 
Adam, therefore, is certainly not a proper name, but 
possibly, was only bestowed on the first man by way of 
preeminence; for the same reason as the Romans might 
call him homo, because he was formed ex humo - though 
no one. will say that the casual circumstance of this para- 
nomasia is any reason why the Latin should be the pri- 
mitive language. The name of Babel itself, which the 
Hebrew text tells us was so called because God did there 
bbl balal, i. e. confound the language of all the earth, 
may, say the compilers of Universal History, vol. i. page 
350, more naturally be derived from the Syriac, in 
which tongue balbel is to confound ; and boblo, or bobel, 



9(3 anti-scepticism; or, 

confusion.* This argument has been further enforced, 
from the significancy of the names of several animals in 
the Hebrew tongue, which are thought to have been im- 
posed by Adam, because of some peculiar qualities in the 
animal to which they were given, correspondent to their 
respective roots. (Bochart.) But since the same may 
be as justly asserted of most other languages, as the 
Hebrew, it will conclude nothing. ( Universal History,) 
Besides, say the compilers of Universal History, we are 
much deceived, if we imagine that the verbs were really 
the original roots of the Hebrew tongue: on the con- 
trary, the greatest part of them, at least, were themselves, 
at first, derived from nouns, though they be now, for 
grammatical convenience, considered as the roots. 
Many examples might be given of the verb's being 
manifestly derived from, and posterior to the noun, in 
all the oriental tongues; so, in English, dog, duck, &c. 
were certainly first imposed as names, and afterwards 
used as verbs, to express actions proper to those crea- 
tures.f All that is to be inferred from the derivation of 
names, is this, that these words were, very probably, 
brought into the Hebrew language, but it does not there- 
fore follow, that the whole Hebrew language descended 
from the same spring whence they were derived.^ Fur- 
ther, the names which are assigned by Moses to eastern 
countries and cities, derived to them immediately from 
the patriarchs, their original founders, are for the most 

* According to Rich and Beauchamp, the mount of Babel adjoining 
Delia Valle's rain, is called by the Arabs, Majelibe', or Makloube, signi- 
fying overturned, as the eastern writers say Babel was by a tempest 
from heaven. — Vide Maurice's Observations on the Ruins of Babylon, 

t Universal History, vol. 1. 

* Crotius, Huetins, Stackhouse. 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 97 

part, says the Rev. Mr. Maurice, the very names by 
which they were anciently known over all the east; 
many of them were afterwards translated, with little va- 
riation, by the Greeks, in their systems of geography.* 
But without the aid of learning, any man, says Bishop 
Watson, who can barely read his Bible, and has but 
heard of such people as the Assyrians, the Elamites, the 
Lydians, the Medes, the Ionians, the Thracians, will 
readily acknowledge, that they had Assur, and Elam, 
and Lud, and Madai, and Javau, and Tiras, grandsons 
of Noah, for their respective founders.-}- Moses has 
traced in one short chapter, (Gen. x.) continues Mr. 
Maurice, all the inhabitants of the earth, from the Cas- 
pian and Persian seas to the extreme Gades, to their 
original, and recorded at once the period and occasion 
of their dispersion. This fact, and the conclusions from 
it, remarks Bishop Tomline, which are thus incontro- 
vertibly established by the newly-acquired knowledge of 
the Sanscreet language, were contended for and strongly 
enforced by Bochart and Stillingfleet, who could only 
refer to oriental opinions and traditions, as they came to 
them through the medium of Grecian interpretation. 
To the late excellent and learned president of the Asiatic 
society, we are chiefly indebted for the light recently 
thrown from the East upon this important subject. 
Avowing himself to be attached to no system, and as 
much disposed to reject the Mosaic history, if it were 
proved to be erroneous, as to believe it if he found it 
confirmed by sound reasoning and satisfactory evidence, 
he engaged in those researches to which his talents and 
situation were equally adapted: and the result of his 

* Maurice's History of Hindostan, vol. 1. 
t Apology for the Bible. — Bishop Watson. 

H 



98' anti-scepticism; or, 

laborious inquiries into the chronology, history, mytho^ 
logy, and languages of the nations, whence infidels have 
long derived their most formidable objections, was a full 
conviction, that neither accident nor ingenuity could ac- 
count for the very numerous instances of similar tra- 
ditions, and of near coincidence in the names of persons 
and places which are to be found in the Bible, and in 
ancient monuments of eastern literature.* Whoever, 
indeed, is acquainted with the writings of Mr. Bryant 
and Mr. Maurice, and with the Asiatic Researches, 
published at Calcutta, cannot but have observed, re- 
marks Bishop Tomline, that the accounts of the creation, 
the fall, the deluge and dispersion f of mankind, re- 
corded by the nations upon the east continent of Asia, 
bear a strong resemblance to each other, and to the nar- 
rative in the sacred history, and evidently contain the 
fragments of one original truth, which was broken by 
the dispersion of the patriarchal families, and corrupted 
by length of time, allegory, and idolatry. From this 
universal concurrence on this head, one of these things 
is necessarily true; either that all these traditions 
must have been taken from the author of the book of 

* Asiatic Researches and Maurice's History. 

t The following curious and valuable commentary on the tenth 
ehapter of Genesis, which records the primitive settlements of the three 
families, is furnished by Abulfaragi, in his History of the Dynasties : — 
"In the 140th Phaleg, the earth was divided, by a second division 
among the sons of Noah. To the sons of Shem was allotted the middle 
of the earth, namely, Palestine, Syria, Assyria, Samarra, (a town of 
Babylonian or Chaldean Irac), Babel, Persia, and Hegiaz (or Arabian 
Petrea). To the sons of Ham — Teman, (or Idumea, Gen. 49th chapter, 
7th verse), Africa, Nigritia, Egypt, Nubia, Ethiopia, Scindia, and India> 
(or western' and eastern India), on both sides of the Indus. To the 
sons of Japheth, also, Garbia, (the North), Spain, France, the countries 
of the Greeks, Selavonians, Bulgarians, Turks, and Arnienians/'-^-Dr. 
Hales, 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 99 

Genesis, who made up his history from some or all such 
traditions as were already extant ; or lastly, that he re- 
ceived his knowledge of past events by revelation. Were 
then all these traditions taken from the Mosaic history ? 
It has been shown by Sir William Jones and Mr. 
Maurice, that they were received too generally and too 
early to make this supposition even possible; for they 
existed in different parts of the world in the very age 
when Moses lived. Was the Mosaic history composed 
from the traditions then existing ? It is certain that the 
Chaldeans, the Persians, the most ancient inhabitants of 
India, and the Egyptians, all possessed the same story ; 
but they had, by the time of Moses, wrapt it up in their 
own mysteries, and disguised it by their own fanciful 
conceits.* 



CHAP. XI. 

No notice in the sacred records respecting the primitive tongue — argu- 
ments of various writers stated — probability that all the people of 
the earth journeyed and settled in the plains of Shinar — division of 
the people of all the earth — remark of Shuckford respecting the 
Babylonian and Hebrew language — answered by a passage in 
Jeremiah, &c. — alphabetic writing — writings of Jol> — language of 
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. 

IT is no where stated in the sacred records, that the 
language of Adam has been preserved; neither, as we 
have already remarked, are the opinions of the learned 
on the subject found to agree. Some writers assert that 
the confusion of tongues at the building of the tower of 
Babel was only partial, and that the primitive language 

* Bishop Tomline— Christian Theology, vol. L 
H2 



100 anti-scepticism; or, 

has been transmitted to the posterity of Eber, or 
Heber.* Other writers, in agreement with this opinion, 
affirm, that the building- of Babel was commenced by the 
worst part of mankind; that they who had departed 
from the piety of their ancestors, were the only people 
who engaged in the undertaking. — In support of this 
doctrine it is asserted, that only part of the posterity of 
Noah journeyed from the East ; but, in contradiction to 
it, other writers maintain that all the people of the earth 
journeyed thither and settled in the plains of Shinar. The 
high probability concerning the truth of this latter opi- 
nion will presently appear. Josephus says that Nimrod 
was the projector of the design of building Babel ; while 
Bochart asserts, with as much confidence, that when the 
project of building the tower was formed, Nimrod must 
have been either very young or even not born. The 
late learned and indefatigable Sir William Jones was of 



* From Eber (Gen. x. 21) Abram is called a Hebrew, Gen. chap, 
xiv. 13, and his posterity Hebrews, Gen. xxxix. 14; Exod. i. 15, 16. 
Some, however, have thought that Eber, in Gen. x. 21, is not a proper 
name : and Abraham is called a Hebrew, not from Eber, as the proper 
name of a man, but as this word imports one who comes from beyond 
the river Euphrates: And then, what we render " the children of 
Eber," imports the inhabitants beyond the river Euphrates. — Bishop 
Kidder. 

By Eber (Numbers xxiv. 24) is meant, either the people bordering on 
the Euphrates ; or the Hebrews, the posterity of Eber. If the former ; 
they, as well as the Assyrians, were subdued both by the Greeks and' 
Romans ; if the latter, which is most probable, they were afflicted, 
though not much by Alexander himself, yet by his successors the 
Seleucidae, and particularly by Antiochus Epiphanes, who spoiled 
Jerusalem, defiled the temple, and slew all those who adhered to the 
law of Moses. Mac. i. 1. 

They were worse afflicted by the Romans, who not only subdued 
and oppressed them, and made their country a province of the empire, 
but at last took away their place and nation, and sold and dispersed 
them over the face of the earth. — Bishop Newton. 



AN INQUIRY, &C. lt)l 

Opinion, that the primitive language of mankind is ex- 
tinct. 

It is very important to the subject of our inquiry to 
ascertain, whether all the people of the earth journeyed 
from the East and settled in the plains of Shinar, or only 
part of them.* On this point the sacred text appears to 
be perfectly decisive. " And the whole earth was of one 
language (or lip), and of one speech. And it came to 
pass as they journeyed from the Eastf that they found a 

* " After a certain time/' says Bishop Tomline, " the whole race of 
Wa moved from their original habitations in Armenia, and settled in 
the plains of Shinar near the Euphrates, in Assyria or Chaldea. Here 
they began to establish themselves, and began to build a city and town 
whose top might reach to heaven." In the two first editions of the 
" Elements of Christian Theology," Bishop Tomline stated that a -part 
only of the inhabitants of the earth "journeyed from the east" and set- 
tled in the plains of Shinar ; " but from a more attentive consideration 
of the subject, to which," says the Bishop, " I have been led by the 
learned and ingenious ' Remarks on the Eastern Origination of Man- 
kind, by Mr. Granville Penn, published in the second volume of the 
Eastern Collections, I have been induced to change my opinion." — Vide 
Christian Theology, 9th edition, vol. 1, page 139. 

t By the east, most persons understand Armenia, where they sup- 
pose the ark rested, and Noah and his sons first planted themselves ; 
but this has a great difficulty in it ; for the mountains in Armenia lay 
north of Shinar or Assyria, and not east. To solve this, Bochart ima- 
gines, that Moses, in this place, has followed the geographical style of 
the Assyrians, who called all that lay beyond the Tigris, the east 
country, though a great part of it, towards Armenia, was really north- 
ward ; and all that lay on this side, they called the west, though some 
of it certainly lay south. (Vide Phaleg, lib. 1.) But there is no need 
of this solution : (vide Stackhouse's Body of Divinity.) For though the 
Gordyean mountains (whereon the ark probably rested) lie in a manner 
north^ of Babel, yet since the plain or valley of Shinar extends itself 
quite up to the mountains of Armenia ; no sooner was Noah and his 
family descended from these Gordyean mountains into the level country 
on the south, but they were very full east of the upper, or northern 
parts of the land of Shinar : so that it might truly and in the most literal 
sense be said, that as they journeyed from the east, they found a plain 
in the land of Shinar. {Wells's Geography.) This, however, has not 
hindered some from carrying the ark as far as mount Caucasus before 



102 anti-scepticism; or, 

plain in the land of Shinar, and they dwelt there. And 
they said one to another, go to, let us make brick, and 
burn them thoroughly. And they had brick for stone, 
and slime had they for mortar. And they said go to, 
let us build us a city, and a tower, whose top may reach 
unto heaven, and let us make us a name, lest we be 
scattered abroad upon the face of the whole earth. And 
the Lord came down to see the city, and the tower 
which the children of men builded. And the Lord said, 
Behold, the people is one, and they have all one language : 
and this they begin to do ; and now nothing will be re- 
strained from them which they have imagined to do. 
Go to, let us go down, and there confound their lan- 
guage, that they may not understand one another's 
speech. So the Lord scattered them abroad from thence, 
upon the face of all the earth : and they left off to build 
the city : therefore is the name of it called Babel (i. e. 
confusion) because the Lord did there confound the lan- 
guage of all the earth : and from thence did the Lord 
scatter them abroad upon the face of all the earth." 

We perceive here, that the people was one, that the 
whole human race had one language ; that to divide this 
union and scatter the people abroad upon the face of all 
the earth, their language (the language of all the earth) 
was confounded. 



it settled, that the people might be said to journey from the East with- 
out all controversy: and because we hear no more of Noah in the 
sacred story, only that he died at such a term of years, they thence 
conclude, that he and his postdiluvian race settled at first in the East, 
and very likely in China itself, since the singularity of the Chinese lan- 
guage, and manner of writing, and the antiquity of their history, their 
polity, and acquaintance with the learned sciences, do plainly denote 
them to have been of a very ancient extraction. — Sir Walter Raleigh's 
Jlisionj ; Whistorts Tlieory ; end Stackhouse's Body of Divinity. 



AN INQUIRY, &C. I OS 

Nothing, possibly, can more strongly impress upon 
our minds the use and power of language, than the con- 
fusion of tongues at the building of the city and tower 
of Babel : it proves the absolute necessity of precision in 
the use of terms of art or science. And when their lan- 
guage was confounded, " They left off to build the 
city." 

But whether the opinion of Bochart respecting Nimrod, 
or that of Josephus be preferred, it is no where attested 
in the sacred writings, that the primitive language was 
transmitted to the sons of Eber ; on the contrary, it is 
expressly said of the children of Shem, in common with 
those of Ham and Japheth, that the earth was divided 
in the days of Peleg, (i. e. division,* separation), " after 
their families after their tongues, in their lands, after 
their nations :" and it is also sufficiently attested in the 
same writings, that the family and posterity of Eber, 
who continued on the other side of the Euphrates, spoke 
the old Chaldean tongue : and, moreover, that Abraham, 
after he had lived seventy-five years in Ur of the Chal- 
dees, went "as the Lord had spoken unto him," and 
dwelt in another land. It has, therefore, been conjec- 
tured, that this Chaldean, or the ancient Syriac, and the 
old Hebrew, were the very same language ; which some 
seem to think is the most ancient language f which has 
descended to us: but it is presumed that this does not 
refer to the Hebrew of the Bible. In this part of our 
inquiry the remark of the Hev. Mr. Maurice is exceed- 
ingly useful: the Chaldea from which Abraham mi- 



* The great dispersion, recorded in Gen. xi. happening just when 
Peleg was born, made his father call him by this name, which signifies 
division and separation. — Bishop Patrick. 

t Sir William Jones has endeavoured to prove from etymology, that 
the Persian was the most ancient language which has descended to us. 



104; anti-scepticism; or, 

grated " was in or near Armenia, and must not be con- 
founded with the country afterwards called Chaldea, the 
capital of which was Babylon." That the languages of 
these two Chaldean countries, at the time of the disper- 
sion, were different from each other, there can be but 
little doubt. This opinion is not affected by the remark 
of Dr. Shuckford, that the Babylonian and Hebrew 
were originally the very same language; 1st. Because 
we read in Jeremiah v. 15 — " Lo I will bring a nation 
[Babylon*) upon you from far, O house of Israel, saith 
the Lord ; it is a mighty nation, it is an ancient nation, 
a nation whose language thou knowest not, neither under- 
standest what they say :" and 2dly. Because Ur of the 
Chaldees was the country of part of the posterity of 
Shem ; and Babylon, of part of the posterity of Ham ; 
and the nations of all the earth were divided and dis- 
persed after their families and after their tongues. 
How long these precise differences lasted it is impossible 
to say : we may, however, easily imagine, that until the 
practice of alphabetical writing w r as universal, each in- 
dividual language would be liable to alteration ; and this 
especially refers to the languages of those countries, 
where the Hebrews and Israelites sojourned, and where, 
after the Egyptian bondage, the Jews settled. But the 
question respecting the first instance of alphabetical 
writing is attended with even more and greater diffi- 
culties than that of language itself. Doubtless, both de- 
rived their origin from the same source ; and it is pretty 
clear, that unassisted reason could have invented neither. 
The almost infinite changes and varieties, which the 
Divine art of alphabetic w r riting is capable of producing, 

* Babylon was built about a hundred, years after the flood : and soon 
after Nimrod erected a kingdom there : whence that country is called 
"■ The land of Nimrod." Mic. v. 6.— W. Lo'.vth. 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 105 

almost confirm us in the opinion, that man received it 
immediately from his Maker. 

The first time that alphabetical writing is mentioned 
in the Pentateuch is in Exodus xvii. 14. " And the 
Lord said write this as a memorial in a book, and re- 
hearse it in the ears of Joshua." — According to the 
chronology of Dr. Lloyd, this was pronounced to Moses, 
three months prior to the promulgation of the law on 
Mount Sinai. But it is generally admitted by sacred 
critics, that the writings of Job were anterior to this 
event, and likewise to the books of the Pentateuch, and, 
consequently, that these are the most ancient records in 
the world.* This circumstance, says Dr. Hales, (UOyly 

* Homer is the most ancient of the profane writers : and, ac- 
cording to the opinion of the late Dr. Hill, of St. Andrew's, in his 
Essays on Ancient Greece, the age in which he lived was about 
1200 years before the Christian era; according to the calculation 
of Sir Isaac Newton, it was 900 years before the Christian era: 
but as the poet has made no allusion to the return of the Hera- 
clidae, which happened 80 years after the taking of Troy, (1270 be- 
fore the Christian era), the conclusion of Dr. Hill appears to be well 
grounded. It is well authenticated that the Greeks acknowledged to 
have received their letters from the Phoenicians.. (Herodotus, Terpsi- 
chore). *Iu>veq irapaXajiovrtg Sica%y trapa rwv Qoiviicwv tcl ypafXfiaTa^ 
et. seq. Iones, cum a Phcenicibus literas didicissent, usi eis sunt cum 
immutatione quadam ; et cum usu professi sunt (ut aequum erat, cum 
eas Phosnices in Grseciam attulissent) qudd litterae illae Phceniciae dice^ 
rentur. Eupolemus, in his book on the kings of Judea, says, Mosem 
primum fuisse sapientum, atque ab eo datam literaturam Judaeis, quae 
ab Judaeis, ad Phcenices pervenerit. (Grotius). Capel, Bochart, and 
Le Clerc have proved that the shape of the letters of the Greeks was 
the same as that of the Phoenician and Samaritan letters. The Cadmean 
alphabet consisted of 16 letters, to which Palamedes added four, and 
Simonides of Melos four others. " The command that every king, upon 
his accession to the throne, should write him a copy of the law in a 
book out of that which is before the priests," Deut. v. 18, is a proof 
not only that the law existed in writing, but that there was a copy of 
it deposited in the tabernacle, or temple. — Bishop Tomline. 

We have the authority of tradition to say that every tribe was fur- 
nished with a copy of the laws before the death of Mo3es. — Ibid* 



106 anti-scepticism; or, 

and Manfs Bible), stamps the highest value upon the 
Book of Job, as a most faithful and authentic monument 
of the language, the learning, the manners, and the reli- 
gion of the earlier and purer patriarchal ages. 

Doubtless, on his arrival at Canaan, Abraham re- 
tained for some time his original tongue ; but after his 
return from Egypt, the long stay which he made in 
Canaan, the possessions he acquired, the alliances he 
contracted, the covenants he made, and the credit and 
conversation he had with the people of the country, 
make it more than probable, that he acquired the 
Canaanitish or Phoenician language, and transmitted it 
to Isaac. Other learned men conceive, therefore, that it 
is no unreasonable conjecture, that the language of Isaac 
and Jacob, instead of being the parent of all, was itself 
descended from that of Canaan. It is acknowledged 
that this conclusion will not be diminished by the cir- 
cumstances of Isaac* and Jacob's journeying for their 

* Gen. xxv. 20. " And Isaac was forty years old when he took 
Rebekah to wife, the daughter of Bethuel, the Syrian, of Padan-Aram, 
the sister to Laban, the Syrian." Bethuel, as also his son Laban, is 
called the Aramite, or Syrian, not as descended from Aram, or a Syrian 
by descent ; but as living in the country which fell to the lot of Aram 
at the first plantation after the flood, (or rather at the general dispersion 
of mankind), and which must accordingly be esteemed a part also of 
Syria, largely taken to denote all the country of Aram. For he lived 
at Haran, and so in the north part of Aram-Naharaim, or Mesopotamia, 
which north part, from the fruitfulness of it, was particularly called 
Padan-Aram, the word Padan denoting a cultivated fruitful ground. — 
Dr. Wells. 

The Syrians were so called, because they were the descendents of 
Aram, the son of Shem. Gen. x. 22. Aram-Naharaim, was the coun- 
try of those Syrians that lived between the two rivers Tigris and 
Euphrates. (Bishop Patrick.) Asshur properly means the descendants 
of Asshur, the Assyrian ; but the Syrians and Assyrians are often con- 
founded together, and mentioned as the same people. The Greeks 
under Alexander the Great subdued all those countries. The Romans 
afterwards extended their empire into the same regions : and Assyria, 
properly so called, was conquered by the emperor Trajan.— Bp. Newton. 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 107 

wives to the East, to the paternal country of Abraham, 
Padan-Aram, near b Ur of the Chaldees ; for while it is 
admitted, that Abraham had acquired the language of 
Canaan, it does not follow, that he had either forgotten 
his native tongue, or that he had not, in some degree, 
transmitted it to Isaac, and that Isaac had not trans- 
mitted it to Jacob. Still it is not improbable, that, 
during the twenty years' stay of Jacob in his father-in- 
law Laban's house, he spoke the language of the place; 
and became as much familiar with that as with the lan- 
guage of Canaan : it seems very probable, I think, that 
he should have cultivated a further knowledge and prac- 
tice of the language of this country ; the country of his 
betrothed w r ife, the country where his heart was glad, 
where " seven years were as a few days." It is here to 
be recollected, that this was the birth-place of the twelve 
sons of Jacob: the original language of the Israelites 
was the same, therefore, or nearly the same, as that of 
Abraham. 

But whether we yield to, or depart altogether from 
the opinion of Le Clerc and Stackhouse, that " The 
Hebrew tongue, instead of being the parent of all, was 
itself descended from that of Canaan," no doubt can pos- 
sibly arise in our minds respecting the change or modi- 
fication of the language of the Hebrews and Israelites 
during the period of 215 years, from the departure of 
Abraham out of the country of Ur of the Chaldees. 
This circumstance is, in some degree, corroborated by 
the passages in Gen. xxxi. 45, &c. respecting the cove- 
nant which was made between Laban and Jacob — "And 
Jacob took a stone, and set it up for a pillar. And 
Jacob said unto his brethren, gather stones; and they 
took stones, and made an heap, and they did eat there 



10S anti-scepticism; or, 

upon the heap. And Laban called it Jegar-saha dutha : 
but Jacob called it Galeed, (the one is a Syriac, the 
other a Hebrew name : both having the same significa- 
tion;" (Bishop Patrick ;) that is, according to the mar- 
ginal reference of the Bible, " the heap of witness." 
" Therefore was the name of it called Galeed (a heap), 
and Mizpah, (a beacon^ or watch tower; marginal 
reference). It is, nevertheless, to be recollected, that the 
journey of Jacob to Padan-Aram, and his twenty years' 
stay there, tended very much to restore to him the ori- 
ginal language of his grandfather, Abraham; but as 
alphabetical writing was not then invented, it is natural 
to conceive, that in proportion to the various relations 
of time, circumstance, and place, the language of the 
children of Israel, though a separate people, would be 
perpetually fluctuating. 



CHAP. XII. 

Causes of the fluctuation of language stated— language of the Israelites 
neither spoken nor generally understood in Egypt at the time of the 
famine— the marriages of Joseph and Moses with Egyptian women — 
the friendship which possibly subsisted between the Israelites and 
the Egyptians until the death of Joseph — the mixed multitude which 
departed from Egypt — the language in which the written law was 
promulgated on Mount Sinai different from the language of the ori- 
ginal or former sons of Eber — from the time of the captivity the 
Hebrew ceased to be a living language. 

IjINGUISTS admit very generally that a living lan- 
guage is liable to various modifications ; this is affirmed 
to be true even when the language has been spoken in, 
its greatest purity, and protected by the efforts of clas- 
sical writers : and we very well know that time, circum- 
stance, and place, do occasion alterations — in all modern 



AN INQUIRY, &CV 100 

languages. The propriety of consenting to this position 
will be felt by referring to the 12th chapter of Judges - , 
the 5th and 6th verses, respecting the pronunciation of 
the sons of Ephraim. " And the Gileadites took the 
passages of Jordan before the Ephraimites i and it was 
so that when those Ephraimites which were escaped, 
said, let me go over, that the men of Gilead said unto 
him, art thou an Ephraimite? if he said, nay; then said 
they unto him, say now Shibboleth : and he said Sibbo- 
ieth : for he could not frame to pronounce it right." 
And certainly what is applicable to a written language, 
as the Hebrew, at the time when the Ephraimites quar- 
relled with Jeptha, must be equally so to a language 
which was not a written one, — as that of the Hebrews 
and Israelites, before their deliverance from the Egyp- 
tian bondage. 

On these points, however, the sacred records are en- 
tirely silent: hence all the opinions respecting them 
must be governed entirely by analogy. But one cir- 
cumstance is well authenticated ; and that is this ; — the 
language of the children of Israel at the time of the 
famine in and about Egypt and Canaan, was not spoken 
or generally understood in Egypt. For when the chil- 
dren of Israel went there to buy corn, and appeared 
before Joseph, he " knew them, but made himself 
strange:" that is, he affected not to know them, but 
conversed with them by an interpreter. " If ye be true 
men, let one of your brethren be bound in the house of 
our prison : go ye, carry corn for the famine of your 
houses. But bring your youngest brother unto me, so 
shall your words be verified, and ye shall not die." — 
" And they said one to another, We are very guilty 
concerning our brother, in that we saw the anguish of 



110 anti-scepticism; or, 

his soul, when he besought us ; and we would not hear : 
therefore is this distress come upon us. And Reuben 
answered and said, spake I not unto you, saying, Do 
not sin against the child, and ye would not hear ? there- 
fore behold, also, his blood is required." And then fol- 
lows, «* They knew not that Joseph understood them: 
for he spake unto them by an interpreter." Gen. xiii. 
19 to 23. Compare Psalm lxxxi. 5. cxiv. 5. — The 
two-and-twenty years' residence, preparatory to this 
event, afforded Joseph ample time to be completely con- 
versant and familiar with the Egyptian language: the 
acquirement of which was to him doubtless a matter of 
necessity: he was an utter stranger in the land; and, 
according to our annotators, his first office was of menial 
employ; but the Lord was with Joseph ; and his master, 
seeing that the Lord was with him, made him overseer 
over all his house ; " And all that he had he put into 
his hand." The wickedness and fury of a voluptuous 
and disappointed woman were the occasion of the sud- 
den dismissal of Joseph, and of his being cast into pri- 
son. — And here we are required to adore the inscrutable 
ways of Providence : for, notwithstanding the most un- 
promising appearances which present themselves, and 
means, which, to us, seem oftentimes the most unfavour- 
able, ends frequently are produced of the utmost vital 
consequence. Such exactly was the instance of the 
affliction of Joseph, of his being sold into Egypt, and 
finally cast into prison. The truth of this is confirmed 
from the results which followed ; and which were occa- 
sioned by the power that enabled him to interpret the 
dreams of the two men in the prison ; and, finally, that 
of Pharoah, which none of the magicians nor wise men 
could explain. " And Pharoah said unto Joseph, 



AN INQUIRY, k& 111 

" Forasmuch as God hath shewed thee all this, there is 
none so discreet and wise as thou art: thou shalt be 
over my house, and, according unto thy word, shall all 
my people be ruled : only in the throne will I be greater 
than thou. And he gave him to wife Asenath, the 
daughter of Potiphorah the priest, (or prince,) of On. — 
And unto Joseph were born two sons before the years of 
famine came; and he called the name of the first-born 
Menasseh, (that is, forgetting,) for God, said he, hath 
made me forget all my toil, and all my father's house. 
And the name of the second called he Ephraim, (that is, 
fruitful,) for God hath caused me to be fruitful in the 
land of my affliction." Gen. xli. — From this it may 
be safely inferred, I think, that the seeds of the Egyptian 
language were likely to be sown in the soil of that of the 
Israelites. The rank to which Joseph was raised, and 
the alliance which he had formed with the daughter of 
Potiphorah, the Egyptian prince, would naturally cause 
the language of Egypt to spread and identify itself, in 
some respects, with the language of the Israelites. It 
was, moreover, the native language of the tribes of 
Manasseh and Ephraim ; and, possibly, was spoken by 
them and their respective families in an uncorrupted 
state for 76 years. And what is true of the language of 
the sons and grandsons of Manasseh, and " Ephraim's 
children of the third generation," is equally true of 
Moses and his generation. Moses was instructed in all 
the wisdom of the Egyptians ; Acts vii. 22. ; his very 
name was derived from the Egyptian language ; for, ac- 
cording to Bryant and Calmet, Mo, or Mou, was the 
Egyptian for water. " Moses fled from the face of 
Pharoah, and dwelt in the land of Midian :" — a part of 
Arabia Pitrea, where some of Abraham's posterity, the 



112 anti-scepticism; on, 

sons of his concubines, were settled, whom he separai 
from Isaac while he lived. " Now the priest or prince 
of Midian had seven daughters, and they came and drew 
water, and filled the troughs to water their father's flock. 
And the shepherds came and drove them away: but 
Moses stood up and helped them, and watered their 
flock. And when they came to Reuel, their father, he 
said, how is it that you are come so soon to day ? And 
they said, an Egyptian delivered us out of the hands of 
the shepherds, and also drew water enough for us, and 
watered the flock. And he said unto his daughters, 
and where is he ? why is it that ye have left the man ? 
Call him that he may eat bread. And Moses was con- 
tent to dwell with the man, and he gave Moses Zepporah, 
his daughter. And she bare him a son, and he called 
his name Gershom : for he said I have been a stranger 
in a strange land." Exodus ii. 15, &c. 

It may be made a standing observation, says Stack- 
house, that the sacred authors do not relate all the par- 
ticulars of a story, as other authors delight to do, but 
such only as are most material. We may, therefore, 
suppose, that a great many things intervened between 
Moses's entrance into Jero's * family, and his marriage 
to the daughter of Jero : especially, considering that his 
children were so young at his return into Egypt, after 
an absence of forty years.f According to Bryant, this 

* The name of the priest of Midian was Jero ; so that either Reuel 
was his name as well as Jero, or else Reuel was the father of Jero, and 
therefore grandfather of these young women. — Bishop Patrick. 

Wis usual in Scripture to call the grandfather, father; see Gen. 
xxiv. 48, where Rebekah is called Abraham's brother's daughter ; she- 
was in fact his grand-daughter.— Bishop Kidder— D' Oyly and ManVs 
Bible. 

•f Stackhouse. 



AN INQUIRY, &C. US 

marriage of Moses was contrary to the usage of his 
forefathers, and of the Hebrews in general: and it 
seemed to intimate that he thought himself quite alie- 
nated from his countrymen: but the writer appears to 
have forgotten the case of Joseph's marriage with the 
daughter of Potiphorah, the Egyptian prince, when 
Joseph forgot all his toil and all his father's house. 
These marriages, as far as the point in question is con- 
cerned, tended, no doubt, to modify and corrupt the 
language of those descended through Isaac, from the 
line of Eber : which number, independently of Jacob, 
Joseph, and his two sons, and Moses, was only three 
score and six ; and before they departed out of Egypt 
increased to 600,000, inclusive of the mixed multitude 
which went with them. 

On their arrival in Egypt, the Israelites w r ere al- 
lowed to dwell in Goshen, and the most active of them 
were permitted to be rulers of the cattle of Pharaoh. 
They were exceedingly prone to mix, and imitate the 
manners of the people, in whatsoever country they 
sojourned. This may be gathered from their history. 

At the end of 124? years after their arrival in Egypt, 
it brought down upon them the vengeance of Almighty 
God ; when a new king arose, who knew not Joseph, 
nor the acts which he had performed in Egypt; when 
taskmasters were placed over the Israelites, and they 
were afflicted with heavy burdens. Thus, having suf- 
fered hard bondage 91 years (which, with the 124 years 
from the death of Jacob, and 215 from the coming of 
Abraham out of his native country, make up the 430 
mentioned) 600,000 of the Israelites departed on foot 
out of Egypt : " and a mixed multitude went also with 
them." That is, as Bishop Patrick explains the passage, 

i 



1 1 t ANTI-SCEPTICISM ; OR, 

there were others besides Israelites; perhaps, they were 
proselytes, who had renounced idolatry : or they were 
persons with whom the Israelites were connected by 
intermarriages. The meaning contained in the last 
clause seems to be corroborated by the interpretation of 
Josephus, and approved of by Dr. Shuckford in the 
passage — " every woman" of the Israelites " shall bor- 
row," or rather according to the Hebrew, aslc, (ask of 
any to give. — Harmer, Shuckford) " of her neighbours." 
The Egyptians made the Hebrews considerable presents : 
and some did so in order to induce them to go the 
sooner away from them : others out of respect to, and 
on account of the acquaintance they had with them. 
That there was something like mutual sympathy and 
friendship during one part of the history of the Israelites 
and Egyptians, may be evidenced in the singular magni- 
ficence of the funeral of Jacob. " And Pharaoh said, 
go up, and bring thy father, according as he made thee 
swear. And Joseph went up to bury his father: and 
with him went up all the servants of Pharaoh, the elders 
of his house, and all the elders of the land of Egypt. 
And all the house of Joseph, and his brethren, and his 
father's house: only their little ones, and their flocks, 
and their herds, they left in the land of Goshen. And 
there went up with him both chariots and horsemen': 
and it was a very great company. And they came to 
the threshing floor of Atad, which is beyond Jordan, 
and there they mourned with a very great and sore 
lamentation: and he made a mourning for his father 
seven days. And when the inhabitants of the land, the 
Canaanites, saw the mourning in the floor (A At ad, they 
said, this is a grievous mourning to the Egyptians, 
-wherefore the name of it was called Abel Mizraim :" 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 115 

that is (according to the margin of the Bible) the mourn- 
ing of the Egyptians. Thus, like Moses in the land 
of Media, the people of Canaan seem to have identified 
the Israelites with the Egyptians. For splendour and 
magnificence, Stackhouse conceived this funeral to be 
without parallel in history. Perhaps, the noble obse- 
quies of Marcellus approach the nearest to it. But 
how do even these fall short of the simple narrative 
before us. For what were the six hundred beds for 
which the Roman solemnities on this occasion were so 
famous, when compared to that national itinerant multi- 
tude, which swelled like a flood and moved like a river ; 
to " all Pharaoh's servants, to the elders of the house, 
and all the elders of the land of Egypt," that is, to the 
officers of his household, and deputies of his provinces ; 
with all the house of Jacob, and "his brethren, and 
father's house," conducting their solemn sorrow for 
near two hundred miles into a distant country.* 

The conclusion to be drawn from this discussion, will 
receive support from the arguments which are advanced 
by Le Clerc to prove that Grotius is correct in his re- 
mark, that the most ancient attic laws, whence the 
Roman laws afterwards were taken, derived their origin 
from those of Moses. Leges Atticae consentaneae sunt 
in multis Hebraicis, quod Attici multas consuetudines 
Cecropi iEgyptio deberent; quodque apud Hebraeos 
Deus multas iEgyptiorum institutis, quibus Hebraei 
adsueti erant, similes leges tulerit, iis tamen emendatis 
quae noxia esse poterant.f A still stronger evidence 
than this, that the Israelites and Egyptians were in- 
fluenced by the manners and conduct of each other, may 

* Stackhouse's Body of Divinity. t Clericus, 



116 anti-scepticism; or, 

be gathered from the notes of Grotius himself, as well as 
by those of Le Gere respecting the remarks of Herodo- 
tus, Diodorus, Strabo, Philo Biblius, concerning the 
ancient rite of circumcision. — The Egyptians, says Bp. 
Patrick, borrowed circumcision either from the Hebrews 
or the Ishmaelites, or some other people descended from 
Abraham. The Jews, says Strabo, liber xvii. p. 824, 
are far from confessing that they derived this custom 
from the Egyptians ; on the contrary, they openly declare 
that the Egyptians learned to be circumcised of Joseph. 
Now it must appear exceedingly plain to any one 
moderately attending to these historical facts and in- 
ferences, that the original language of Abraham must 
have undergone very considerable alterations prior to 
the departure of the Israelites out of Egypt, and of their 
becoming more peculiarly a separate and distinct people* 
The circumstance of all the people of the earth journey- 
big from the East and settling in the plains of Shi?iar> 
therefore — the occurrences and results of the journey of 
Jbraham into the land of Canaan — of the- history of 
Joseph and his montage with an Egyptian princess — of 
the tribes of Manasseh and Ephraim, who probably mar- 
ried Egyptian women — of the friendship which possibly 
subsisted between the Israelites and the Egyptians until 
the death of Joseph- — of the history of Moses and his 
Egyptian learning, his marriage with a princess of Media 
— of the mixed multitude which departed from Egypt, and 
of other incidents that might be enumeruted y — all these 
circumstances, and the results of all these relations and 
particulars^ during a period of 430 years, when alpha- 
betical writing was unknown, or if known, it must have 
been only in a very small degree, known, perhaps only 
to Moses, who, according to Dr. Magee, probably read 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 11 7 

the Book of Job to the Israelites under the Egyptian 
bondage, to teach them the great duty of submission to the 
mil of God, — I say all these circumstances must surely 
have occasioned various modifications and alterations m 
the language of the posterity of Ab?*aham t prior to the 
promulgation of the written law as set forth in the ancient 
copies of the Bible. 

These are some of the arguments which prove that 
the original language of mankind has not, through the 
Hebrews, been transmitted to us. The language in 
which the Pentateuch was originally written, was, doubt- 
less, the common language of the Israelites, at the time 
when they were conducted into the wilderness of Sinai ; 
and the language of the Pentateuch was as likely the 
same as that in which the Lord declared unto them his 
covenant on Mount Sinai. " And when the voice of 
the trumpet sounded long and waxed louder, Moses 
spake, and God answered by a voice;" Exodus xix. 19. 
" These words the Lord spake unto all your assembly 
in the mount, out of the midst of the fire, of the cloud, 
and of the thick darkness, with a great voice, and he 
added no more, and he wrote them on two tablets of 
stone, and delivered them unto you. And it came to 
pass when ye heard the voice out of the midst of the 
darkness (for the mountain did burn with fire) that ye 
came over unto me, even all the heads of your tribes, 
and your elders. And ye said, behold the Lord our 
God hath shewed us his glory, and his greatness, and 
we have heard his voice out of the midst of the fire : we 
have seen this day that God doth talk with man, and he 
liveth." Deut. v. 22, 3, 4. 

The ceremonial and civil laws were intermixed with 
each other, and, by divine appointment, were instituted 



118 anti-scepticism; on, 

for the very purpose of separating the Israelites from the 
idolatrous Canaanites, and estranging them from all 
other customs of the heathens : on this account, and on 
this alone, they were esteemed a holy and peculiar people 
with God. " And ye shall be holy unto me; for I, the 
Lord, am holy, and have severed you from other people, 
that ye should be mine." — The conclusion to be drawn 
from the whole of these arguments, is, that the language 
of the Israelites on their being delivered out of Egypt, 
or the language in which the written law was promul- 
gated on Mount Sinai, was different from the old Syriac 
or Chaldean language, and also different from the lan- 
guage of the original or former sons of Eber. This 
statement exactly corresponds with the subsequent his- 
tories of the Bible, and particularly with the history of 
king Hezekiah, 2 Kings, chap, xviii. 26 ; Is. xxxvi. 2 ; 
and also in the 5th chapter of Jeremiah, 15th verse; 
1st chapter of Daniel, 4th verse; and 2d chapter, and 
4th verse ; — whereas, in all of which passages, it appears, 
that the Syrian language was unknown to the Jews.* 
" The Aramean or Syrian language,! as understood in 
its largest sense, is what was spoken by the Assyrians, 
Babylonians, and many of the neighbouring nations, 
and the same with what was called the ancient Chaldee. 
This language, when corrupted by the introduction of 
many Hebrew words, is called the Hebrew tongue in 
the New Testament. The language spoken in Antioch 
and other parts of Syria, differs as a dialect from the 



* If this Syrian were the language of Eber, it is presumed that it 
was not unknown to Abraham. 

+ But possibly this Syrian language is a union, or nearly so, of the 
dialects of Ur of the Chaldees, and the other Chaldea, the capital of 
which was Babylon. 



AN INQUIRY, &C. 119 

former, and is what we now call the Syriac." ( Wintle ; 
TV. Lowth ; JyOyly and Manfs Bible ,• Dan. chap. ii. 4.) 
From the period when the written law was given to the 
Israelites, down to the time of the Babylonish captivity, 
it is universally allowed that the Hebrew language un- 
derwent very little alteration ; at least as little alteration 
as was effected in the Greek language from the time of 
Hesiod and Homer to that of Longinus, occupying a 
space of 1200 years. It is, however, shewn by Bishop 
Marsh, that there is just difference enough in the various 
books of the Bible to shew, that its authenticity is se- 
cure. "It is certain," says he, " that the five books 
which are ascribed to Moses, were not written in the 
time of David, the Psalms of David in the age of Isaiah, 
nor the prophecies of Isaiah in the time of Malachi. 
(Marsh on the authenticity of the five Books of Moses.) — 
It is generally admitted, that, at the time of the Baby- 
lonish captivity, the Hebrew gradually ceased to be a 
living language, and that the anomalous jargon in which 
modern Jews converse with each other, is very far re- 
moved from the Hebrew of the Bible. 



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